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ABSTRACT 
 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are transactions between landholders and the 
beneficiaries of the services their land provides. PES schemes are growing worldwide with 
annual transactions over ten billion dollars (Salzman et al., 2018). Much can be learned 
from looking at oldest and best funded PES schemes on working agricultural land. Initiated 
in 1985, the USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is the oldest private 
conservation PES program in the United States. CRP incentivizes farmers to put their land 
into conservation through an annual payment. In Iowa, CRP has been a source of extra 
income and a way for farmers to buffer the fluctuating costs of cash crops, such as corn 
and soy. The dominance of agriculture in Iowa poses many challenges for water quality. A 
potential solution to the problem, implemented through CRP, is the use of conservation 
practices to mitigate the negative effects of agricultural run-off.  
 
This dissertation considers three aspects of the problem: 
1. the relationship between changes in land cover due to CRP enrollment and changes 
in water quality, controlling for a range of factors known to have an effect on the 
filtering role of different land covers; 
2. the inter-annual variability in water quality measures and enrollment in different 
CRP conservation practices to examine the cost-effectiveness of specific 
conservation practices in mitigating lake sedimentation and eutrophication; 
3. discrete choice models to identify what characteristics drive the enrollment by 
farmers into specific conservation practices.  
 ii 
Results indicate that land cover and CRP have different impacts on different indicators of 
lake water quality. In addition, conservation practices that were cost-effective for one water 
quality variable tended to be cost-effective for the other water quality variables. Farmers 
are making decisions to enroll in CRP based on the opportunity cost of the land. Therefore, 
it is necessary to alter financial incentives to promote productive land being putting into 
CRP through continuous sign-up. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
needs a more effective way to calculate the payment level for practices in order to be 
competitive with the predicted value of major crops.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
 
Between 2001 and 2005 nearly 1,400 experts worldwide contributed to the development 
of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), which formalized the role of ecosystem 
services in social and environmental decision making. Following the MEA, the benefits 
from managed or natural ecosystems were characterized as ecosystem services of four 
types:  
 
(1) Supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling;  
(2) Provisioning services such as the production foods, fuels, water, and fibers;  
(3) Regulating services that affect climate regulation, water quality, water quantity; and  
(4) Cultural services that include the non-consumptive recreational, spiritual, and aesthetic 
benefits of ecosystems and the species they support.  
 
Since the MEA, payments for ecosystem services (PES) have exploded as a market-based 
policy tool for conservation. In its simplest sense, a PES scheme is a transaction between 
landholders and the beneficiaries of the services their land provides (Salzman et al., 2018). 
It is established on the principle that those who benefit from ecosystem services should pay 
for them, and those who contribute to generating these services should be compensated for 
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providing them (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder and CIFOR, 2005). The main characteristics 
of a PES mechanism are that it is: 
 
(1) a voluntary transaction where  
(2) a well-defined ecosystem service (or land use likely to secure that service) 
(3) is bought by a (minimum of one) service buyer  
(4) from a (minimum of one) service provider 
(5) payment being conditional on service provision (conditionality) (Wunder and CIFOR, 
2005). 
 
Physical Effectiveness, Additionality, Efficiency, and Cost-Effectiveness in PES Schemes 
 
There are four key aspects to consider when evaluating a PES scheme: physical 
effectiveness, additionality, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness. Physical effectiveness 
identifies whether there has been an improvement in an ecosystem service as a result of a 
land use change. For the purposes of this dissertation, physical effectiveness is defined as 
a statistically significant positive effect on at least one water quality variable.  
 
Additionality looks at whether or not land uses paid for under a PES scheme would exist 
in the absence of a payment. For example, would a farmer reforest an area without a 
payment for doing so? If so, then there is no additionality. Absent additional service 
provision there is no justification for payments to landholders. Claasen et al. (2018) 
estimate additionality for selected practices using propensity score matching to analyze 
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data from the Agricultural Resource Management Survey. They found that greater than 
95% of off-field structural practices (e.g., filter strips, riparian buffers) supported by 
payments were additional but that less than 50% of conservation tillage payments yielded 
additional adoption. Their results suggest that additionality is highest for practices that have 
high up-front cost, little or no on-farm benefit, or both.  
 
But additionality can vary greatly. Mezzatesta et al. (2013) found high additionality for 
practices that take land out of crop production or otherwise impose costs while providing 
little on-farm benefit in the short run. They used survey data and found that additionality 
varied dramatically between practice types. Specifically, the percent additionality was 
highest for filter strips, hayfields, and cover crops, while it was lowest for conservation 
tillage.  
 
Efficiency in PES schemes implies that the marginal benefits and marginal costs of service 
provision should be equal. The marginal cost of the service is the opportunity cost of the 
farmer. The opportunity costs of participation are those associated with the benefit 
foregone from alternative land activities (Wunder et al., 2008). The marginal benefit 
offered by such schemes is the value of the increment in service provision they induce. In 
practice, very few PES schemes base payments on the value of increments to ecosystem 
services.  
 
Most PES schemes base payments on the cost of service provision, and test not the 
efficiency but the cost-effectiveness of service delivery. That is, they seek the least costly 
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method for delivering a specific increment in service provision, or for meeting a particular 
environmental target. Cost-effectiveness looks at the least costly method for delivering a 
specific increment in service provision for meeting a particular environmental target.  
 
Most recent studies of CRP have focused on additionality rather than cost-effectiveness 
(Claassen et al., 2014; Khanna, Madhu, and Yang, 2011; Mezzatesta, M., Newburn, D.A., 
Woodward, 2013). Yet, cost-effectiveness is particularly critical to examine in order to 
provide suggestions to program managers on how to achieve water quality targets at least 
cost.  
 
The Conservation Reserve Program 
 
Much can be learned from looking at the oldest and best funded PES schemes on working 
agricultural land. The two precursors are the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and 
European Union agro-environmental schemes1. 
 
                                               
1 The idea for PES schemes, specifically CRP, stems from agro-environmental schemes (AES) that have existed in 
Europe for decades. AESs were first introduced into the European Union’s (EU) agricultural policy during the late 1980s 
as an option to be applied by EU Member States. According to the European Commission, “agro-environmental schemes 
(AES) provide payments to farmers who subscribe, on a voluntary basis, to environmental commitments related to the 
preservation of the environment and maintaining the countryside (2015).” An example of an AES program similar to 
CRP is in France. Two evaluations of this scheme reveal the challenge in effectiveness. Prince et al (2012) evaluated the 
effectiveness of French AES schemes to enhance farmland bird diversity on a national scale. The authors identified 
whether temporal trends in farmland bird abundance had been more positive in areas with higher landscape density of 
AES measures. They found that the areas that participated in the AESs did not greatly improve the bird diversity, except 
mildly for long-term declining bird species. In addition, Chabe-Ferret and Subervie (2013) analyzed the same program 
but focused on seven AESs, including plant buffer strips along rivers and streams. They propose that the AES subsidizing 
grass buffer strips could be socially efficient despite large windfall effects (they are making the tradeoff between 
additionality and windfall). They contend that these farmers would have adopted greener practices even if the AES had 
not been implemented; in other words, there are no additionality or windfall effects.  
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CRP is considered the oldest PES scheme in the United States. As such, CRP benefits from 
a wealth of data. Initiated in 1985, the CRP initially targeted the reduction of soil erosion 
caused by wind and water. Farms could voluntarily participate in two conservation 
practices designed to maintain groundcover and reduce soil erosion – one program 
introduced native species and the other introduced non-native species. In return for putting 
a piece of their land into what the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) calls 
“retirement,” farmers received a yearly payment based on the average opportunity cost of 
their land. Contract durations ranged between 10-15 years with a penalty for ending a 
contract before the expiration date (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, 2007). 
Since then, the range of environmental objectives has grown. According to the Farm 
Service Agency’s CRP Handbook, the CRP’s objective is to encourage owners and 
operators to conserve and improve land resources in a cost-effective manner (United States 
Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2015).  
 
In Iowa, CRP has been a source of extra income and a way for farmers to buffer the 
fluctuating costs of cash crops such as corn and soy. Not only does it allow farmers to 
derive income from land that is unsuitable for agricultural purposes, but also to add 
conservation practices to currently productive land. In 2016 there were 23.8 million acres 
in CRP nationally. Of the 800,000 acres added in that year, 128,212 were from Iowa—the 
most of any state. This brought the Iowa total to 1.6 million acres on approximately 52,800 
farms (Doering, 2016). 
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The expansion of the goals of the CRP partly reflected growing public awareness of the 
off-site impacts of agricultural practices. The perception that water quality is compromised 
by agricultural practices, for example, is now widespread. In Iowa, the focus of this 
dissertation, upstream farmers were recently sued by the City of Des Moines residents for 
the damage caused by increased levels of pesticides and fertilizers in their drinking water 
(Hanson et al., 2016). While the case was unsuccessful, it demonstrates that there is an 
increasing recognition of the effects of off-site agricultural practices. 
 
Most U.S. private land conservation programs rely on incentives to change farmer 
behavior. The alternative, regulations, are an unpopular way to address environmental 
problems in rural areas (Dowd et al., 2008; Dupont, 2010). The CRP operates exclusively 
through incentives. Nonetheless, evidence for the effectiveness of incentives aimed at 
water quality is lacking (State-EsPA Nutrient Innovations Task Group, 2009). This may be 
because initially mechanisms were poorly designed to impact water quality. 
 
Based on the literature and experience with PES, the main policy concerns are physical 
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and targeted participation. The scientific challenge 
becomes how to test for each. Each one of the chapters addresses this issue from a different 
angle. In the case of CRP and water quality in Iowa, Chapter 2 tests for physical 
effectiveness of the CRP. Chapter 3 tests for cost-effectiveness of CRP practices. Chapter 
4 tests for the sensitivity of participation in different CRP practices based on a range of 
characteristics.   
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Summary of Chapters 
 
This dissertation is broken up into five chapters, including the introduction (Chapter 1) and 
conclusion (Chapter 5). Chapter two demonstrates the relationship between changes in land 
cover due to CRP enrollment and changes in water quality, controlling for a range of factors 
known to have an effect on the filtering role of different land covers. Chapter three utilizes 
the inter-annual variability in water quality measures and enrollment in different CRP 
conservation practices to examine the cost-effectiveness of specific conservation practices 
in mitigating lake sedimentation and eutrophication. Chapter four uses discrete choice 
modeling to identify what characteristics drive the enrollment of farmers into specific 
conservation practices. The final chapter includes a summary of the three substantive 
chapter results, provides recommendations and policy implications, and identifies next 
steps for future research. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Water quality in lakes offers the best measure of the physical effectiveness of CRP. While 
CRP does not have a specific goal to improve lake water quality, it does aim to improve 
water quality in the rivers feeding into lakes (L. Karlen Karlen et al., 1998). No research 
to date has looked at the impact of CRP on lakes and lake water quality in Iowa. The 
purpose of chapter two is to explore how CRP practices affect water quality. There exists 
little knowledge on the effect of the spatial distribution and quantity of vegetation types 
(crops vs. CRP land) on lake sedimentation and eutrophication. Chapter two considers the 
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effect of crops, natural cover, and CRP on water quality in 135 lakes in Iowa between 2010 
and 2015. Seven models of increasing specificity are analyzed using fixed effects, while 
other models were evaluated (random effects, Arellano-Bond estimator, first differences). 
Land cover and CRP have different impacts on different indicators of lake water quality. 
The amount of land in CRP is associated with improvements in lake water quality. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Chapter three evaluates the cost-effectiveness of CRP practices in Iowa that target water 
quality, either alone or in combination with other environmental objectives. Since many of 
the outcomes associated with different CRP practices overlap there are limits to the 
conclusions that can be drawn about the cost-effectiveness of practices generating multiple 
benefits, but for more targeted practices, we are able to say which achieves a given 
increment in service provision at least cost. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
While many people have written about participation in CRP, there remains a gap in the 
literature regarding what drives enrollment in specific CRP practices. These drivers could 
be farm-specific, time-varying, or practice-specific factors. Understanding what leads to 
enrollment in specific conservation practices will allow the USDA to improve targeting for 
ecosystem service provision, in this case for water quality. Chapter 4 utilizes multiple 
discrete choice modeling methods to identify what independent variables drive farmers to 
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enroll in different conservation practices. We are interested both in the way that the 
physical characteristics of farms determines the type of practice farmers are able to enroll 
in, and the way that farmers’ choices are influenced by the CRP price structure and the 
opportunity cost of enrollment. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
Being one of the longest standing conservation programs, much research has already been 
conducted on the CRP. CRP is, in and of itself, an interesting topic for research. CRP 
attempts to address the issue of how to manage public goods or assets that exist on private 
land. There is a sizeable amount of public goods, biodiversity and ecosystem services, that 
flow from private lands. Since most ecosystem services are public goods, markets often do 
not exist to incentivize their protection. In addition, as CRP is an example of a PES scheme, 
a better understanding of the factors influencing enrollment and cost-effectiveness for CRP 
may carry over to other PES schemes. By having a clearer understanding of what works in 
CRP and why, we may be in a better position to understand what works in other schemes. 
 
Market-based mechanisms for conservation alter an individual’s or farmer’s actions by 
compensating him or her for making land use decisions that are linked to ecosystem service 
provision. Climate regulation, water quality, and water quantity are the traditional services 
involved in these mechanisms. There is a wide range of activities that could lead to the 
creation, preservation, or maintenance of ecosystem services. For example, in a particular 
watershed these could be reforestation, avoided deforestation, agroforestry, natural 
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regeneration, and/or silvopastoral systems. The results of such activities lead to collective 
outcomes: reduction of carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere, reduction of 
sedimentation, regularity of water flow, water source protection, or reduction of 
contamination. These outcomes are not mutually exclusive; thus, multiple ecosystem 
services can be maintained as a result of a given land use change. 
 
The provision of ecosystem services has been most successfully accomplished through 
market-based mechanisms. Incentive-based policies address externalities by altering the 
economic incentives private actors face, while allowing those actors freedom to decide 
whether and how much to change their behavior. Most incentive-based mechanisms have 
been initiated through public policies, although privately negotiated incentive-based 
solutions also exist. An incentive-based mechanism is seen as a policy solution for 
realigning private and social benefits resulting from decisions related to the environment 
(Jack et al., 2007). In addition, since CRP is a publicly funded mechanism, a better 
understanding of farmer behavior can help ensure it is spent in a cost-effective way. 
 
 
 
  
 11 
CHAPTER 2: LAND COVER AND THE CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM: WATER 
QUALITY IN IOWA’S LAKES 
 
Introduction  
 
As water moves through an agricultural landscape it can carry with it various sediments, 
fertilizers, and pesticides. Nutrient loads are strongly affected by hydrology and watershed 
characteristics such as soil type, land use, and land cover, all of which may vary with 
climate (Kosten et al., 2009).  While the type of land cover is known to have an impact on 
how much residue in run-off ends up in waterways and water bodies, there is little 
information on the relative effectiveness of different vegetation types (crops, natural cover, 
and conservation land) in filtering sediments and nutrients (Tong and Chen, 2002). To date, 
most empirical studies of nutrient reductions from nonpoint sources have been relatively 
small scale, generally due to the daunting amount of data required to capture both the 
pollution processes—the fate and transport of pollutants—and the decisions of individual 
economic agents that determine land cover (A N Sharpley et al., 2009).  
 
The challenge to water quality stems from the dominance of agriculture in many states. 
Iowa has lost proportionally more area of its native vegetation than any other U.S. state. 
Corn and soybeans occupy 63% of the state’s total land area and 82% of its cropland 
(National et al., 2014). This has had large impacts on water quality. Forty six of one 
hundred and forty lakes in Iowa are on the impaired water list as a result of algae, turbidity, 
and pH (Iowa Department of Natural Resources, 2016). A potential solution to the problem, 
implemented through the CRP, is the use of various conservation practices to mitigate the 
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negative effects of agricultural run-off. Water quality is explicitly targeted by a number of 
CRP practices, but is also indirectly affected by several others. 
 
In 2001, research by Iowa State University and the Iowa State Limnology Lab on 132 lakes 
revealed that the primary value of lakes in Iowa is for recreation (Azevedo et al., 2003). 
The majority of the recreational lakes in Iowa are shallow, manmade lakes, with a few 
deeper, glacial lakes located in northern Iowa near Minnesota (see Figure 1). While CRP 
does not have a specific goal to improve lake water quality, it does aim to improve water 
quality in the rivers feeding into lakes (L. Karlen Karlen et al., 1998). In this chapter, the 
effect of the CRP on lake water quality is investigated for 135 lakes in Iowa, over the period 
2010 to 2015. 
  
Figure 1. Iowa's Lakes 
 
Source: (Iowa Department of Natural Resources, 2018) 
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Table 1 demonstrates the average percentage of land cover within the lake watersheds. 
Most notable is that there has not been much change in gross land cover. Thus, if an effect 
of CRP is detected it will be via a change in a particular land cover. 
 
Table 1. Change in Shares of Land Cover (2010-2015) 
Year Corn Soy Water Developed 
Grass  
Pasture 
Forest  
Trees 
Wetlands  
Shrublands 
Other 
Crops 
2010 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.11 0.02 0.03 
2011 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.03 0.07 
2012 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.05 
2013 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.05 
2014 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.06 
2015 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.04 
 
Recreational use privileges some water quality measures over others. Egan et al (2009) 
conducted a detailed analysis of the relationship between ten lake water quality measures 
in Iowa. They also explored lake users’ perception of the importance of different indicators. 
They found that the diversity of land uses in the Iowa lake watersheds leads to a relatively 
low degree of collinearity among the physical and chemical water quality measures, with 
correlation coefficients ranging from -0.53 to 0.68, and typically lying below 0.4.  
 
Based on these findings we selected four water quality variables from the Iowa State 
Limnology Lab. Secchi depth measures the depth at which the secchi disk in a lake can 
still be seen. Chlorophyll a is an indicator of phytoplankton plant biomass, which leads to 
greenness in the water. Total nitrogen is the sum of all dissolved and particulate forms of 
nitrogen: NH3 + NH4 being ammonium nitrogen deriving from fertilizer or anaerobic 
conditions, NO3 + NO2 being nitrates from aerobic nutrient contributions. Total 
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phosphorus is the principal limiting nutrient that determines phytoplankton growth in 
freshwater systems (Egan et al., 2009). 
 
While the percentage of CRP in lake watersheds overall is small, it doubled during the six-
year study period from 1.7% to 3.4%. Focusing on four lake water quality characteristics— 
nitrogen, phosphorus, chlorophyll a and turbidity (reported as secchi depth)— there exists 
a slight decrease in the average value of phosphorus in the lakes, and a large decrease in 
nitrogen and turbidity over the study period. Improvement in turbidity is measured by an 
increase in secchi depth—the depth at which an 8 inch secchi disk can no longer be seen 
through the water (Davies‐Colley and Vant, 1988). The only water quality characteristic to 
have worsened in the study period is chlorophyll a (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Average Value of Four Lake Water Characteristics (2010-2015) 
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In this chapter we consider the relationship between changes in land cover due to CRP 
enrollment and changes in water quality, controlling for a range of factors known to have 
an effect on the filtering role of different land covers. Section 2 identifies sources that were 
utilized to obtain the necessary data for the various analyses. It also goes through the seven 
model specifications and a justification for the different methods applied, ultimately using 
fixed effects for the core analysis. Section 3 focuses on the main results from the fixed 
effects model for the four lake water quality characteristics, highlighting overlap with the 
random effects results. Section 4 discusses how the results compare to other PES schemes 
and potential implications.  
  
Data and Methods 
 
The Iowa State Limnology Lab has consistently measured lake water quality characteristics 
three times during the summer (between June and September) since 2000. For this chapter, 
the average of the three samples was calculated. The four main water quality characteristics 
examined were phosphorus; nitrogen, specifically (Phenate)Ammonia Nitrogen (NH3 + 
NH4+) as N; secchi depth as a proxy for turbidity; and chlorophyll a. Phosphorus and 
nitrogen are known to cause algae blooms. Chlorophyll a is contained in phytoplankton 
that in excess lead to algae blooms. Turbidity can be the result of algae or dissolved 
particles. Changes in these variables would demonstrate whether or not CRP and land 
covers are having an impact on lake water quality. In addition, lake depth, again taken as 
the average measurement for the summer, was also obtained from the Iowa State 
Limnology Lab for 2010 through 2015.  
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Data on land enrolled in CRP was provided as a geodatabase from the USDA Farm Service 
Agency (FSA) of land that entered into CRP between 2010 and 2015, both new contracts 
and re-enrollments. Specifically, these were shapefiles of land that entered into CRP 
through general and continuous sign-up each year. Raster level data for Iowa on land use 
cover was obtained from the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). 
This dataset is a combination of information on crops from the USDA and land cover from 
the USGS National Land Cover Database (NLCD). Shapefiles for lakes and lake 
watersheds were obtained from the Iowa State Department of Natural Resources. All 
spatial data were converted to a non-spatial format using QGIS and Python.  
 
Additional information on soil type was obtained from the U.S. Natural Resources 
Conservation Service Soil Survey Geographic 2014 and monthly precipitation information 
was gathered from the Iowa State Iowa Environmental Mesonet Climate Monitoring 
Stations. The closest weather station to each lake centroid was used; if there were two 
weather stations that were equidistant then the data was averaged. Information on the 
location of Confined Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) was obtained from Iowa 
Department of Natural Resources Animal Feeding Operations Database from 2006 to 2007 
as point data. It is assumed that the location of the CAFOs is fixed through the study period. 
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Model Specification 
The meta model for this analysis is as follows: 
Log(Ylt) = θlt + β1X1t + β2X2t + β3X3t + β4X4t + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 + εlt + εl 
Θlt = constant 
X1t = Share of grouped land covers: water, development, corn, other crops, wetlands  
and shrublands, forests and trees, and grass pasture (soy as omitted base) 
X2t = Percentage CRP of crops: amount of CRP as a percentage of total land use in the  
lake watersheds 
X3t = Percentage land cover as CRP: amount of CRP identified as a land cover times  
the share of that land use 
X4t = Precipitation: monthly average of precipitation measured in millimeters 
X5 = CAFOs: dummy variable for presence/absence of CAFOs on a 30m x 30m pixel  
scale 
X6 = Soil Type: dominant soil type on a 30m x 30m pixel scale, non-time varying 
X7 = Lake Depth: measured in meters, an average of 3 samples during summer annually 
 
There are seven regressions that were utilized for the four lake water quality characteristics 
for 135 lakes between 2010 and 2015. The model has increasing specification. The initial 
regression does not include land that is enrolled in the CRP program. This base model only 
looks at the amount of land that was in different land covers (β1X1t) from the USDA 
Cropland Data Layer. These land covers were grouped into seven categories - water, 
development, corn, other crops, wetlands and shrublands, forests and trees, and grass 
pasture. Soy was omitted as the base for analysis so that all others land cover results are 
measured in comparison to soy. The reasoning for the first model is to understand the role 
of land cover on the lake water characteristics when CRP is not taken into account. Land 
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covers across the landscape have demonstrated both positive and negative impacts on lake 
water quality (Reed and Carpenter, 2002). 
 
The second model includes land cover (β1X1t) and introduces CRP as a percentage of total 
land cover in the lake watersheds (β2X2t). This is a general measure to understand whether 
or not increasing the amount of land in CRP in a lake watershed would improve any of the 
four lake water quality characteristics. By adding CRP to the first model we are controlling 
for land cover and looking at CRP’s impact holding land cover constant. 
 
The third model builds on the analysis of the second model by introducing an interaction 
variable (β3X3t). Through implementation of a probability transition model for land 
enrolled in CRP and land identified as different land cover types through the USDA 
Cropland Data Layer (CDL), it is clear that even once land was enrolled in CRP it shows 
up in the CDL as various land covers. For example, one might think that once land is 
enrolled in CRP it would show up as trees or grass, but in fact is some areas, particularly 
on the boundaries of other land covers, it is still identified by the CDL as being corn or 
another land cover type. Conservation practices, such as filter strips, are generally three 
meters wide, which is smaller than the CDL raster size, so it does not show up as a distinct 
land cover.  
 
In addition, measurement errors occurred in the processing of the CDL. The USDA 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 
2018) describes these inaccuracies between 2010 and 2015, “The training and validation 
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data used to create and accura[tely] assess the CDL has traditionally been based on ground 
truth data that is buffered inward 30 meters…This would be inconsequential if those edge 
pixels were similar in nature to the rest of the scene but they are not as they tend to be more 
difficult to classify correctly. Thus, the accuracy assessments as have been presented are 
inflated somewhat.” 
 
In order to understand if there is heterogeneity in the effects of CRP, a variable that 
interacts the amount of CRP identified as a land cover multiplied by the share of that land 
cover was created. Specifically, this is looking to see if CRP identified as a land cover is 
having an impact or if CRP coupled with a land cover may have a different impact than 
solely the amount of CRP.  Holding the land cover and percent of CRP in the watersheds 
fixed, this regressor, (β3X3t), identifies the marginal effect as a percentage of CRP 
identified as a particular land cover. 
 
The fourth model begins to include other external variables that have been identified in the 
literature as highly likely to impact the four lake water quality characteristics. Specifically, 
this model introduces precipitation that was averaged from monthly data (X4t). 
Precipitation was broken up into the four seasons since the frequency and duration of 
precipitation during the year changes greatly. The impact of snow pack in the winter 
months was thought to have a different impact on lake water quality than spring and 
summer rains (Hoering, 2010; Rose et al., 2004). 
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The fifth model includes a dummy variable for the presence of concentrated animal feeding 
operations (CAFOs) (X5). Fertilizer runoff from CAFOs is known to contain high levels of 
nitrogen and phosphorus (Burkholder et al., 2007; Hribar, 2010). While Iowa has put 
restrictions in place to regulate the amount of runoff, this remains important because of the 
quantity of operations in the state. This was included as a dummy variable because there is 
only data on CAFOs for one year. In addition, there is no available information on the size 
of the CAFOs.  
 
Soil type (X6) is written about consistently in the literature as having an impact on lake 
water quality (Detenbeck ’ et al., 1993; Sharpley, A.N., Chapra, S.C., Wedepohl, R., Sims, 
J.T., Daniel, T.C. and Reddy, 1994) and as such is included as a critical variable in the 
sixth model. Soil type may be a proxy for two different variables: 1. The land cover that is 
able to grow on top of a particular soil and 2. The likelihood that a particular soil type 
contributes to an increase or decrease in runoff. This information was recorded as the 
dominant soil type. 
 
The last model includes lake depth (X7), which has also been identified as a key variable 
in understanding lake water quality due to mixing that occurs within lakes and distinct 
limnology of deep versus shallow lakes (University of Wisconsin, 2016). In addition, lake 
depth varies considerably in Iowa. The lakes in northern Iowa near Minnesota are glacial 
lakes and are much deeper than the manmade lakes that exist throughout the rest of the 
Iowa.  
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Estimators 
 
Fixed effects with a one-year lag was initially utilized to test the hypothesis that the value 
of each lake water quality characteristic from the previous year was a predictor for the 
current year. In addition, oftentimes even after a conservation practice is introduced there 
may be a delay in seeing the results of it, particularly for lake water quality (Meals and 
Dressing, 2008). For the dynamic fixed effects model the lagged dependent variable was 
negative for phosphorus, nitrogen, and chlorophyll a and positive for turbidity. There is 
reason to question the validity of this model since we would expect the opposite results on 
the lag. This led us to investigate the Arellano-Bond estimator (Appendix A) as an 
alternative to fixed effects with a lag since through Arellano-Bond consistent estimators 
can be obtained utilizing past lags for IV estimation by first differencing (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). 
 
In order to avoid an endogeneity problem, the differenced unobserved time-invariant 
component of the Arrellano-Bond estimator should be unrelated to the second lag of the 
dependent variable and the lags thereafter. The test for serial correlation for the Arrelano-
Bond estimator demonstrated that for all lake water quality variables we reject no 
autocorrelaton of order one, but cannot reject no autocorrelation for phosphorus, 
chlorophyll a, and turbidity of order two. Only for nitrogen was no autocorrelation rejected 
for order one and two. In addition, the lagged dependent variable was negative for 
phosphorus, nitrogen, and chlorophyll a, as well as being positive for turbidity, signaling a 
possible issue with this estimator. 
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After eliminating the dynamic models, we investigated whether it was more appropriate to 
use a fixed effects or random effects model. For all four of the dependent variables the 
robust Hausman test was performed to identify whether or not random effects was 
appropriate. All four tests strongly rejected the null hypothesis demonstrating that random 
effects was likely not the most appropriate estimator compared to fixed effects when cluster 
robust standard errors are used. Without cluster robust standard errors, the standard 
Hausman test rejects the null for chlorophylla and turbidity, but the null cannot be rejected 
for nitrogen and phosphorus. Since the random effects model is used when we assume the 
unobserved time invariant error is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge, 2009), at minimum it is useful to compare the random effects results to fixed 
effects.  
 
Lastly, first differences, first differences with a lag, fixed effects with a lag, and random 
effects with a lag were evaluated. When the time varying errors are serially uncorrelated, 
fixed effects is more efficient than first differencing. The results of fixed effects and first 
differences are similar in the four lake water quality measures. See Appendix A for the 
results of the additional regressions for the full specification model. 
 
Results 
 
The results of the fixed effects model are presented in Tables 2 through 5 reporting 
coefficients and significance in each of the seven specifications for each measure of water 
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quality. The results of the seven models demonstrate distinct influences on the four water 
quality characteristics. 
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Table 2. Phosphorus, Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 lntotalP lntotalP lntotalP lntotalP lntotalP lntotalP lntotalP 
WATERSHARE -0.124 -0.132 0.108 -0.0112 -0.0366 -0.0366 0.0330 
 (-0.08) (-0.08) (0.05) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.02) (0.02) 
DEVELOPEDSHARE 1.276** 1.119* 2.664 2.020 2.047 2.047 1.956 
 (2.30) (1.93) (1.52) (1.09) (1.11) (1.11) (1.04) 
WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE 0.560 0.829 0.754 0.0408 -0.0416 -0.0416 -0.113 
 (0.59) (0.81) (0.52) (0.03) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.08) 
FORESTTREESSHARE -1.123 -1.298 -2.600 -2.833 -2.869 -2.869 -2.938 
 (-0.94) (-1.05) (-1.50) (-1.52) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.57) 
CORNSHARE 0.297 0.340 0.198 0.138 0.148 0.148 0.157 
 (1.00) (1.11) (0.44) (0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) 
GRASSPASTURESHARE 1.157** 0.971 1.402* 0.576 0.569 0.569 0.547 
 (2.03) (1.62) (1.75) (0.72) (0.71) (0.71) (0.69) 
OTHERCROPSSHARE 1.290* 1.111 2.707** 2.109* 2.141* 2.141* 2.136* 
 (1.74) (1.38) (2.54) (1.80) (1.82) (1.82) (1.82) 
PerCRPofCrops  0.545 0.537 0.605 0.606 0.606 0.603 
  (0.98) (0.91) (0.87) (0.86) (0.86) (0.86) 
PerCornCRP   0.0000230 -0.0000322 -0.0000281 -0.0000281 -0.0000303 
   (0.21) (-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.23) (-0.25) 
PerGrassPastureCRP   -0.0000290 0.00000399 0.00000598 0.00000598 0.00000514 
   (-0.40) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
PerForestTreesCRP   0.000714 0.000825 0.000838 0.000838 0.000830 
   (0.82) (0.95) (0.96) (0.96) (0.95) 
PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP   -0.0000223 -0.00000164 0.000000631 0.000000631 0.00000458 
   (-0.17) (-0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
PerWaterCRP   -0.000716 -0.000945 -0.000958 -0.000958 -0.000975 
   (-0.76) (-0.90) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.93) 
PerDevelopedCRP   0.000453 0.000253 0.000274 0.000274 0.000276 
   (0.26) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
PerOtherCropsCRP   -0.000247* -0.000231 -0.000236 -0.000236 -0.000244 
   (-1.75) (-1.53) (-1.55) (-1.55) (-1.60) 
Fall_Precip    0.0151* 0.0146 0.0146 0.0145 
    (1.71) (1.64) (1.64) (1.64) 
Winter_Precip    -0.0251** -0.0263** -0.0263** -0.0261** 
    (-2.38) (-2.50) (-2.50) (-2.47) 
Spring_Precip    0.0129** 0.0128** 0.0128** 0.0131*** 
    (2.58) (2.56) (2.56) (2.63) 
Summer_Precip    -0.000957 -0.000859 -0.000859 -0.000467 
    (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.14) 
CAFO     0.164 0.164 0.173 
     (1.31) (1.31) (1.39) 
Alfisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Entisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Inceptisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Mollisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
NoData      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Iowa LL Lake Depth       -0.0154 
       (-0.50) 
Constant 4.141**** 4.190**** 4.122**** 4.263**** 4.198**** 4.198**** 4.290**** 
 (9.58) (9.04) (7.18) (7.32) (7.18) (7.18) (7.07) 
Observations 765 747 570 570 570 570 570 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001    
 
 
Few significant results were found for phosphorus in the fixed effects model. This is 
consistent across all models (Arellano-Bond, random effects, etc.) that were tested, 
indicating that the role of CRP is less important for phosphorus than for nitrogen. 
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The main difference between the fixed effects and the random effects models for 
phosphorus is that the share of forests and trees as a land cover is highly significant across 
all specifications in the random effects model. The share of forests and trees has a strong 
effect in decreasing the levels of phosphorus in the lakes by decreasing the amount of water 
that enters the lake at any one time and mitigating the movement of phosphorus across the 
soil (Huang et al., 2013; Read et al., 2015). An increase in the amount or shares of forest 
and trees by 1% would lead to a decrease in the amount of phosphorus in a lake watershed 
on average by 186% in the random effects model. 
 
Winter precipitation is negative and highly significant, while spring precipitation is 
positive and highly significant in the fixed effects and random effects models. Winter 
precipitation, which comes in the form of snow pack, has the result of decreasing the 
amount of phosphorus in lakes since the phosphorus is not as mobile, while precipitation 
during the spring increases the amount of phosphorus in the lakes. Heavy rains in the spring 
will increase the runoff of phosphorus from fertilizers placed on crops (Schippers et al., 
2006). During the winter less fertilizer is used, in addition to the snow pack decreasing 
movement. 
 
Dominant soil type and lake depth cannot be estimated for fixed effects, but in the random 
effects model entisols and inceptisols have the effect of decreasing the level of phosphorus 
in the lakes. Both soil types do not have highly defined soil horizons and thus have the 
result of reducing phosphorus since the land cover above the soils is likely to be a natural 
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cover that reduces erosion thus decreasing runoff as well as the amount of phosphorus in 
the soils. 
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Table 3. Nitrogen, Fixed Effects 
 
 
Of all four lake water characteristics, nitrogen is the only one where the percentage of CRP 
as crops is significant and has the result that a higher percentage of CRP leads to a decrease 
in the level of nitrogen in the lakes in both fixed effects and random effects models. The 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 lntotalN lntotalN lntotalN lntotalN lntotalN lntotalN lntotalN 
WATERSHARE -20.52**** -18.46**** -15.15** -7.304 -7.394 -7.394 -7.695 
 (-4.16) (-4.23) (-2.35) (-1.27) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.32) 
DEVELOPEDSHARE -5.983** -6.375*** -14.69**** -8.257** -8.164** -8.164** -7.771** 
 (-2.28) (-2.64) (-4.21) (-2.43) (-2.40) (-2.40) (-2.27) 
WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE -10.66**** -11.52**** -11.58*** -7.413** -7.704** -7.704** -7.395** 
 (-3.64) (-4.00) (-3.04) (-2.31) (-2.37) (-2.37) (-2.24) 
FORESTTREESSHARE -9.995** -8.514** -10.96** -2.997 -3.123 -3.123 -2.828 
 (-2.46) (-2.14) (-2.49) (-0.70) (-0.73) (-0.73) (-0.66) 
CORNSHARE 0.387 0.511 0.288 0.409 0.444 0.444 0.405 
 (0.46) (0.59) (0.30) (0.42) (0.45) (0.45) (0.41) 
GRASSPASTURESHARE -4.957*** -5.587*** -3.708* -3.640* -3.664* -3.664* -3.568* 
 (-2.76) (-3.11) (-1.75) (-1.76) (-1.77) (-1.77) (-1.71) 
OTHERCROPSSHARE -4.030 -4.615* -1.464 -2.517 -2.404 -2.404 -2.384 
 (-1.65) (-1.87) (-0.50) (-0.86) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-0.82) 
PerCRPofCrops  -9.670*** -6.666** -5.168** -5.164** -5.164** -5.152** 
  (-3.27) (-2.61) (-2.48) (-2.47) (-2.47) (-2.45) 
PerCornCRP   -0.000581** -0.000278 -0.000263 -0.000263 -0.000254 
   (-2.00) (-0.84) (-0.79) (-0.79) (-0.77) 
PerGrassPastureCRP   -0.000839**** -0.000792**** -0.000785**** -0.000785**** -0.000781**** 
   (-4.76) (-3.90) (-3.86) (-3.86) (-3.81) 
PerForestTreesCRP   0.000249 0.00193 0.00198 0.00198 0.00201 
   (0.16) (1.36) (1.39) (1.39) (1.41) 
PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP   -0.000853*** -0.000767*** -0.000759*** -0.000759*** -0.000776*** 
   (-3.16) (-3.06) (-3.04) (-3.04) (-3.05) 
PerWaterCRP   -0.000882 -0.00138 -0.00143 -0.00143 -0.00136 
   (-0.60) (-1.02) (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.01) 
PerDevelopedCRP   0.00279 0.00277 0.00285 0.00285 0.00284 
   (1.31) (1.15) (1.19) (1.19) (1.16) 
PerOtherCropsCRP   -0.00102** -0.00118** -0.00119** -0.00119** -0.00116** 
   (-2.27) (-2.46) (-2.50) (-2.50) (-2.40) 
Fall_Precip    -0.0794**** -0.0810**** -0.0810**** -0.0806**** 
    (-4.16) (-4.19) (-4.19) (-4.15) 
Winter_Precip    -0.0435* -0.0474** -0.0474** -0.0481** 
    (-1.95) (-2.08) (-2.08) (-2.12) 
Spring_Precip    0.0369*** 0.0367*** 0.0367*** 0.0353*** 
    (3.19) (3.17) (3.17) (3.07) 
Summer_Precip    0.0448**** 0.0451**** 0.0451**** 0.0434**** 
    (6.79) (6.85) (6.85) (6.44) 
CAFO     0.581*** 0.581*** 0.543** 
     (2.72) (2.72) (2.50) 
Alfisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Entisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Inceptisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Mollisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
NoData      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Iowa LL Lake Depth       0.0665 
       (0.95) 
Constant 10.92**** 10.80**** 10.79**** 7.580**** 7.349**** 7.349**** 6.954**** 
 (7.64) (7.75) (7.01) (5.02) (4.89) (4.89) (4.29) 
Observations 765 747 570 570 570 570 570 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001    
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increase in the amount of CRP in a lake watershed by 1% would lead to a decrease in the 
amount of nitrogen in the respective lake by 515%.  
 
An increase in the share of wetlands and shrublands and the share of grass pasture can lead 
to a decrease in the amount of nitrogen in the lakes. Similarly, an increase in the percent 
CRP as wetlands shrublands and the percent CRP as grass pasture can lead to a decrease 
in the amount of nitrogen in the lakes. An increase in the amount of CRP identified as 
wetlands would decrease the amount of nitrogen by .000776%. Wetlands are well known 
for their role in removing nitrogen, particularly nitrates, from agricultural drainage 
(Driscoll et al., 2003). Similarly, an increase in the amount of CRP identified as grass 
pasture would decrease the amount of nitrogen by .000781%.  
 
Precipitation during all seasons is significant in both fixed effects and random effects 
models. During the fall and winter, an increase in precipitation, generally in the form of 
snow pack, leads to a decrease in nitrogen, since less nitrogen is applied during this time 
and the snow leads to a decrease in runoff. During the spring and summer an increase in 
precipitation from rainfall leads to an increase in nitrogen in the lakes compounded by an 
increase in the application of nitrogen-based fertilizers. The average precipitation during 
the fall and winter over the study period were 2.41 mm and 1.34 mm respectively. The 
average precipitation during the spring and summer during the study period were 3.60 mm 
and 5.00 mm respectively. 
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CAFOs are significant such that an increase in the number of CAFOs will lead to an 
increase in the amount of nitrogen. Manure runoff from discharging CAFOs often reaches 
surface water systems through surface runoff or infiltration. In 2007, the estimated animal 
manure in Iowa was 398,551 (1000 kg of N), higher than any other state besides Texas 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.).  
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Table 4. Chlorophyll a, Fixed Effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
lnchlorophyll
a 
lnchlorophyll
a 
lnchlorophyll
a 
lnchlorophyll
a 
lnchlorophyll
a 
lnchlorophyll
a 
lnchlorophyll
a 
WATERSHARE 4.010 3.276 5.277 3.880 3.877 3.877 4.093 
 (1.31) (1.02) (1.31) (1.03) (1.03) (1.03) (1.12) 
DEVELOPEDSHARE 2.777** 2.275* 8.331*** 7.497*** 7.500*** 7.500*** 7.219*** 
 (2.23) (1.84) (3.37) (3.20) (3.20) (3.20) (3.07) 
WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE 3.015** 3.023* 3.097 3.114 3.106 3.106 2.885 
 (2.05) (1.95) (1.41) (1.41) (1.40) (1.40) (1.31) 
FORESTTREESSHARE 2.774 2.541 5.007** 3.306 3.302 3.302 3.091 
 (1.65) (1.44) (2.02) (1.50) (1.49) (1.49) (1.38) 
CORNSHARE 0.0287 0.0148 -0.420 -0.333 -0.332 -0.332 -0.304 
 (0.08) (0.04) (-0.78) (-0.60) (-0.60) (-0.60) (-0.54) 
GRASSPASTURESHARE 1.672 1.086 0.431 1.577 1.576 1.576 1.508 
 (1.60) (1.09) (0.36) (1.25) (1.25) (1.25) (1.20) 
OTHERCROPSSHARE 2.950** 2.239 2.046 3.292* 3.295* 3.295* 3.281* 
 (2.07) (1.58) (1.18) (1.75) (1.75) (1.75) (1.74) 
PerCRPofCrops  0.446 -0.672 -1.200 -1.200 -1.200 -1.209 
  (0.36) (-0.41) (-0.85) (-0.85) (-0.85) (-0.86) 
PerCornCRP   -0.000396** -0.000429** -0.000428** -0.000428** -0.000435** 
   (-2.03) (-2.09) (-2.09) (-2.09) (-2.06) 
PerGrassPastureCRP   0.000190* 0.000132 0.000132 0.000132 0.000129 
   (1.82) (1.23) (1.23) (1.23) (1.21) 
PerForestTreesCRP   0.00156 0.00107 0.00107 0.00107 0.00105 
   (1.37) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (0.95) 
PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP   -0.000130 -0.000176 -0.000176 -0.000176 -0.000164 
   (-0.53) (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.69) 
PerWaterCRP   -0.00189* -0.00119 -0.00119 -0.00119 -0.00124 
   (-1.86) (-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.21) 
PerDevelopedCRP   -0.000563 -0.000428 -0.000425 -0.000425 -0.000421 
   (-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
PerOtherCropsCRP   -0.0000559 -0.0000820 -0.0000825 -0.0000825 -0.000107 
   (-0.20) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.39) 
Fall_Precip    -0.00426 -0.00430 -0.00430 -0.00458 
    (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.45) 
Winter_Precip    0.0579**** 0.0578**** 0.0578**** 0.0583**** 
    (3.68) (3.61) (3.61) (3.63) 
Spring_Precip    -0.0217*** -0.0217*** -0.0217*** -0.0207*** 
    (-3.04) (-3.03) (-3.03) (-2.87) 
Summer_Precip    -0.00776* -0.00775* -0.00775* -0.00654 
    (-1.88) (-1.87) (-1.87) (-1.57) 
CAFO     0.0167 0.0167 0.0433 
     (0.13) (0.13) (0.30) 
Alfisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Entisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Inceptisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Mollisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
NoData      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Iowa LL Lake Depth       -0.0476 
       (-1.32) 
Constant 1.577* 1.909** 1.228 1.657 1.650 1.650 1.933* 
 (1.92) (2.26) (1.19) (1.63) (1.63) (1.63) (1.88) 
Observations 765 747 570 570 570 570 570 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 **** 
p<0.001    
 
For chlorophyll a, the percent of corn as CRP is highly significant in both fixed effects and 
random effects models. An increase in the amount of land that is enrolled in CRP and 
identified as corn by the USDA CDL leads to a decrease in the amount of chlorophyll a in 
the lakes. CRP is picked up as corn because particular CRP practices such as filter strips 
 31 
are only 3-4 meters across and thus not picked up by the satellite. This is further 
investigated in the Discussion section of this chapter.  
 
Winter and spring precipitation are highly significant in both fixed effects and random 
effects models. Winter precipitation leads to an increase in chlorophyll a. In the winter 
months, a 1 mm increase in average precipitation will increase the amount of chlorophyll 
a in the lakes on average 5.83%. In contrast, during the spring months, a 1 mm increase in 
average precipitation will decrease the amount of chlorophyll a in the lakes by 2.07%. 
 
Shares of land in the natural cover forest and trees is significant only in the random effects 
model. This means that as there is an increase in the share of forest and trees in the lake 
watersheds, there is a decrease in the amount of chlorophyll a in the lakes.  
 
While not significant in the fixed effects model, in the random effects model entisols are 
highly significant. Since entisols possess less developed soil horizons they are unlikely to 
be good fit for crops, as such if there was a natural land cover above entisols it would lead 
to a decrease in runoff, reducing the amount of chlorophyll a in the lakes. Lastly, lake depth 
is highly significant in the random effects model – the deeper the lake the lower the amount 
of chlorophyll a found in the lake. An increase in lake depth by 1 meter will lead to a 
decrease in the amount of chlorophyll a in the lakes by 4.76%. 
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Table 5. Turbidity (Secchi Depth), Fixed Effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
lnsecchidept
h 
lnsecchidept
h 
lnsecchidept
h 
lnsecchidept
h 
lnsecchidept
h 
lnsecchidept
h 
lnsecchidept
h 
WATERSHARE 1.864 1.450 -1.555 -1.202 -1.206 -1.206 -1.390 
 (0.69) (0.50) (-0.36) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.31) 
DEVELOPEDSHARE -1.518** -1.448* -1.978 -1.009 -1.005 -1.005 -0.766 
 (-2.22) (-1.93) (-0.74) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.38) (-0.29) 
WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE -0.483 -0.448 -1.133 -0.487 -0.498 -0.498 -0.310 
 (-0.36) (-0.33) (-0.53) (-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.23) (-0.14) 
FORESTTREESSHARE 3.139** 2.823* 1.961 3.154 3.148 3.148 3.329 
 (2.08) (1.83) (0.94) (1.46) (1.45) (1.45) (1.53) 
CORNSHARE -0.109 -0.109 -0.00433 0.0500 0.0515 0.0515 0.0275 
 (-0.37) (-0.35) (-0.01) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.07) 
GRASSPASTURESHARE -1.044 -0.932 -0.975 -1.040 -1.041 -1.041 -0.983 
 (-1.51) (-1.19) (-0.97) (-0.99) (-0.99) (-0.99) (-0.94) 
OTHERCROPSSHARE -1.025 -0.931 -1.574 -1.472 -1.467 -1.467 -1.455 
 (-1.10) (-0.89) (-1.08) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
PerCRPofCrops  2.064 1.728 1.839 1.839 1.839 1.846 
  (1.49) (1.16) (1.25) (1.25) (1.25) (1.27) 
PerCornCRP   0.000326* 0.000329* 0.000330* 0.000330* 0.000335* 
   (1.89) (1.82) (1.82) (1.82) (1.89) 
PerGrassPastureCRP   0.000165** 0.000169** 0.000169** 0.000169** 0.000172** 
   (2.31) (2.36) (2.36) (2.36) (2.43) 
PerForestTreesCRP   0.000906 0.00103 0.00103 0.00103 0.00105 
   (1.24) (1.38) (1.38) (1.38) (1.46) 
PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP   0.000298* 0.000294* 0.000295* 0.000295* 0.000284* 
   (1.86) (1.84) (1.84) (1.84) (1.79) 
PerWaterCRP   0.00202** 0.00159* 0.00159* 0.00159* 0.00164* 
   (2.33) (1.78) (1.78) (1.78) (1.80) 
PerDevelopedCRP   -0.00132 -0.00138 -0.00138 -0.00138 -0.00138 
   (-1.24) (-1.32) (-1.32) (-1.32) (-1.35) 
PerOtherCropsCRP   0.000296 0.000287 0.000286 0.000286 0.000307 
   (1.61) (1.51) (1.51) (1.51) (1.65) 
Fall_Precip    0.00671 0.00664 0.00664 0.00688 
    (0.79) (0.78) (0.78) (0.81) 
Winter_Precip    -0.0202* -0.0203* -0.0203* -0.0208* 
    (-1.85) (-1.82) (-1.82) (-1.85) 
Spring_Precip    0.00160 0.00159 0.00159 0.000754 
    (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.11) 
Summer_Precip    0.00418 0.00419 0.00419 0.00316 
    (1.22) (1.22) (1.22) (0.94) 
CAFO     0.0238 0.0238 0.00103 
     (0.18) (0.18) (0.01) 
Alfisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Entisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Inceptisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Mollisols      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
NoData      0 0 
      (.) (.) 
Iowa LL Lake Depth       0.0406 
       (1.35) 
Constant -0.456 -0.428 0.0472 -0.291 -0.300 -0.300 -0.541 
 (-0.81) (-0.69) (0.06) (-0.33) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.63) 
Observations 765 747 570 570 570 570 570 
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001   
 
When lake water transparency is high, the secchi depth is high. Secchi depth is measured 
the opposite of nitrogen, phosphorus, and chlorophyll a. This means that a positive result 
for a right-hand side variable has the effect of decreasing turbidity. 
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Corn identified as CRP for turbidity yields a similar result to chlorophyll a, which remains 
to be highly significant in both fixed effects and random effects models, with an increase 
of land cover going into conservation through CRP and identified as corn reducing 
turbidity. A 1% increase in the amount of CRP identified as corn will lead to a decrease in 
turbidity by 0.000335%, a small yet significant amount.  
 
Turbidity is the only lake water quality characteristic where water, grass pasture, and 
wetlands shrublands identified as CRP are all significant. A 1% increase in the amount of 
CRP identified as water will lead to a decrease in turbidity by 0.00164%. This is for a 
similar reason to corn – land in CRP that is small and acting as a buffer is picked up by the 
satellite as water instead of CRP.  
 
A 1% increase in the amount of CRP identified as wetlands shrublands will lead to a 
decrease in turbidity by 0.00284%. A 1% increase in the amount of CRP identified as grass 
pasture will lead to a decrease in turbidity by 0.000172%. Grass buffers have been shown 
to effectively provide reduction in runoff and sedimentation (Mankin et al., 2007).  
 
All four – corn, water, grass pasture, and wetlands shrublands – identified as CRP are 
significant in both the random effects and fixed effects models. This means that one of the 
most critical opportunities for reducing turbidity is to put land into CRP to act as a buffer 
around the water bodies that feed into the lakes or the lakes themselves. 
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Unlike chlorophyll a, inceptisols are significant in the random effects model and have the 
result of reducing turbidity. In chlorophyll a, entisols were significant and reduced the 
amount of chlorophyll a. Yet both inceptisols and entisols do not have highly defined soil 
horizons and thus inceptisols have the result of reducing turbidity for the same reason that 
entisols reduce the amount of chlorophyll a in the lakes – the land cover above the soil is 
likely to be a natural cover that reduces erosion thus decreases the turbidity in the lakes.  
 
Turbidity is the only water quality variable where precipitation does not seem to have an 
impact. A similar result (Kebede et al., 2006) found that low sensitivity of lakes to rainfall 
is typical for lakes with significant outflow. Lake depth is also highly significant in the 
random effects model – increasing lake depth leads to a decrease in turbidity. This is a 
similar result to a study of lakes done in the 1990s - lake mean depth held the most promise 
with respect to water quality prediction (Hatch, 1992). 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
  
The results of our analysis demonstrate that land cover and CRP have different impacts on 
different indicators of lake water quality. CRP does not appear to have a major impact on 
phosphorus. None of the models estimated revealed a significant association between CRP 
practices and the level of phosphorus in the lakes between 2010 and 2015. This is not 
completely surprisingly since oftentimes phosphorus attaches to sediment and is not 
displaced in water. Phosphorus already accumulated within some watershed systems is 
such that even if phosphorus was no longer added to agricultural systems, there would be 
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a considerable time-lag before improvements in water quality, or regeneration of diverse 
habitats, might become apparent. For example, construction of small wetlands to trap 
phosphorus in agricultural drainage waters of central Switzerland only retained 2% of the 
bioavailable phosphorus input (Sharpley et al., 2009). 
 
While little results were found for phosphorus, increasing the amount of forests and trees 
in lake watersheds could have a positive impact. Since the number of conservation 
practices implemented in Iowa that includes trees is minimal, more cost-effective 
improvements can be taken for the other three lake water quality characteristics. 
 
The story is different for the other three lake water quality characteristics. There exists a 
particularly strong association between the amount of land enrolled in CRP in the lake 
watersheds and nitrogen in the lakes. Nitrogen in the lakes derives from both CAFOs and 
cultivated land. So, CRP practices addressing either source would be expected to have a 
positive effect on lake quality. According to the results, the largest reduction in nitrogen 
would come from increasing the amount of land enrolled in CRP in the lake watersheds.  
  
Amount of land in CRP had a positive impact on decreasing nitrogen. This is extremely 
critical since as of 2018 55% of the nitrogen load in the Missouri River comes from Iowa 
(Eller, 2018). In 2018, Iowa invested $420 million in those water quality improvements, 
including helping farmers plant cover crops, build terraces and tackle other conservation 
practices that hold nutrients in place. 
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Assessments of conservation practice impacts on reducing nitrogen and phosphorus 
contamination of Iowa’s surface waters reveal generally positive long-term impacts with 
wide ranges of impacts in the short-term (annually to single precipitation events) (Dinnes, 
2004). Conflicting effects can also occur between nitrogen and phosphorus for a given 
conservation practice. Some forms are more potent in causing eutrophication than others, 
such as dissolved reactive phosphorus being more available for algae growth than 
particulate phosphorus. 
 
Chlorophyll a, similar to phosphorus, is not improved by land covers or much of CRP, but 
there is a noticeable improvement in the level of chlorophyll a from CRP identified as corn. 
Corn identified as CRP is known to take the form of filter strips on the landscape. 
Chlorophyll a also seems to have a similar story for forests and trees utilizing the lens of 
the random effects model. Turbidity is impacted by the most types of land covers identified 
as CRP, but the impact was smaller.  
 
Riparian buffers and wetlands may do little to reduce nutrient and sediment losses if they 
receive water volumes and nutrient loads beyond their capacity to treat due to the absence 
of other conservation practices within a contributing drainage area. This may be 
particularly true if concentrated flow frequently occurs from peak precipitation events. In 
such instances it is not the conservation practice that failed: the failure was due to not 
having designed and implemented a comprehensive conservation management plan 
(Dinnes, 2004). Strategies to reduce nitrogen and phosphorus losses may require the 
application of different conservation practices for the two nutrients. 
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PES contracts frequently look at whether payment led to a change in practice, not whether 
a change in practice had the desired impact on water quality. This is often due to a lack of 
baseline data, funds for monitoring, and a long enough time series to see an impact. 
 
Two major disadvantages of conservation practices are that they are very costly to 
taxpayers and that in the decades that this model has been in use it has rarely achieved 
adoption at scales sufficient enough to significantly improve water quality (Dinnes, 2004). 
 
We want to focus on the practices that do have an impact on water quality improvement. 
Those that do and are cost-effective are great targets for the USDA to promote. This will 
be directly addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: IDENTIFYING COST-EFFECTIVE APPROACHES FOR TARGETED 
IMPROVEMENT OF WATER QUALITY FOR IOWA’S LAKES THROUGH THE USDA’S 
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM 
 
Introduction 
 
In the CRP a wide range of practices are used to enhance the provision of a specified set 
of ecosystem services (Table 6). In principle, the cost-effectiveness of service provision is 
assured by the sign-up mechanisms applied. Currently, there are two ways farmers can sign 
up to participate in the CRP: ‘general sign-up’ and ‘continuous sign-up’. General sign-up 
includes mechanisms designed to assure cost-effective provision of services of uncertain 
value. Continuous sign-up has no mechanisms for cost-effectiveness but is restricted to 
services thought to be of high value.  
 
Across the United States as a whole, the dominant form of sign-up is general. General sign-
up has periods that are announced for when farmers can enroll. During sign-up, farmers 
submit offers for the amounts they are willing to accept to enroll acreage in the CRP. 
County Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) offices calculate the maximum 
acceptable rental rate for the acreage being submitted (maximum payment rate) and offers 
are ranked at the national office using an environmental benefits index (EBI). According 
to the Farm Service Agency (FSA), offers selected are those that provide the greatest 
environmental benefits considering the cost of enrolling the acreage in the program (United 
States Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2015).  
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For continuous sign-up, farmers can enroll at any time. The practices available during 
general sign-up generally provide high environmental benefits to large areas when 
compared to the acreage on which the practice is implemented. The continuous sign-up 
process does not have a competitive evaluation process, and aims to enroll small, 
environmentally sensitive areas and target acreage (United States Department of 
Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2015). The presumption is that continuous practices 
generate disproportionate benefits and as such do not need to go through a more formal 
process (R. Iovanna, personal communication, April 26, 2018). Appendix B provides a 
table of all of the conservation practices and what type of enrollment they fall under.  
 
Interestingly, sign-up patterns in the study area, Iowa, are different from sign-up patterns 
in the Unites States more generally. Continuous sign-up enrollments account for only 25% 
of the acreage under CRP contract across the United States (Hellerstein, 2017). By contrast, 
continuous sign-up enrollments account for more than 50% of CRP acreage in Iowa. The 
share of continuous sign-up enrollments has been declining in Iowa. In 2010, 63% of land 
in CRP was in continuous sign-up, while in 2015 the share had fallen to 53% (see Figure 
3). Regardless, it is still significantly above the national percentage of continuous sign-up 
land. 
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Figure 3. Number of Acres Enrolled in General and Continuous Sign-up in Iowa 
 
 
This chapter evaluates the cost-effectiveness of CRP practices in Iowa that target water 
quality, either alone or in combination with other environmental objectives. Since many of 
the outcomes associated with different CRP practices overlap there are limits to the 
conclusions that can be drawn about the cost-effectiveness of practices generating multiple 
benefits, but for more targeted practices, we are able to say which achieves a given 
increment in service provision at least cost. The 43 conservation practices included in this 
analysis were grouped into six categories based on the purported benefits (see Table 6 
below). The information to group the conservation practices comes from the internal FSA 
CRP handbook (United States Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2015). 
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Table 6. Benefits and CRP Practices 
Benefit CRP Practices 
Multiple benefits CP1, CP2, CP3, CP3A, CP10, CP11, CP31 
Habitat CP4B, CP4D, CP9, CP12, CP25, CP33, CP36, CP37, CP38A, 
CP38B, CP38C, CP38D, CP38E, CP42 
Erosion CP5A, CP17A, CP17, CP24 
Water Quality CP8A, CP8, CP15A, CP15B, CP21, CP22, CP23, CP23A, CP27, 
CP28, CP29, CP30, CP39, CP40, CP41 
Other CP16A, CP18B, CP18C 
 
There are two ways to look at the change in conservation practices over time. The first 
looks at change in acres over time. From Figure 4 it is clear that there was an increase in 
acres for all of the conservation practice groups. The second looks at the percentage of 
shares over time. There is a slight increase in shares of habitat conservation practices from 
25% to 28%, an increase in multiple benefit conservation practices from 21% to 30%, and 
a decrease in shares of water targeted conservation practices from 51% to 41% between 
2010 and 2015. 
 
Figure 4. Acres and Shares in Conservation Practices 
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Within the grouped conservation practices, there is significant variation in the change in 
acres. Figures 5, 6, and 7, demonstrate the change in acres relative to 2010. For example, 
in the water targeted conservation practices, CP8A (Grass Waterways, Noneasement) 
doubled in acres while CP29 (Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer) stayed 
relatively constant between 2010 and 2015. 
 
Figure 5. Water Targeted Conservation Practices (Change in Acres, 2010 to 2015) 
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Figure 6. Multiple Environmental Targeted Conservation Practices (Change in 
Acres, 2010 to 2015) 
 
 
Figure 7. Habitat Targeted Conservation Practices (Change in Acres, 2010 to 2015) 
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In what follows we utilize inter-annual variability in water quality measures and enrollment 
in different CRP conservation practices to examine the cost-effectiveness of specific 
conservation practices in mitigating lake sedimentation and eutrophication. Section 2 
identifies sources that were utilized to obtain the necessary data for the various analyses. It 
also addresses the model specification and a justification for the different estimators 
applied, ultimately using fixed effects and an Arellano-Bond estimator for the core 
analysis. Section 3 focuses on the main results for the most cost-effective conservation 
practices for the four lake water quality characteristics. Section 4 discusses the importance 
of the four water quality variables and the most cost-effective CRP practices for water 
quality improvement. Section 5 concludes with a discussion on cost-effectiveness of the 
CRP and conservation practices. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Data 
 
The Iowa State Limnology Lab has consistently measured lake water quality characteristics 
three times during the summer (between June and September) since 2000. For this study, 
the average of the three samples was calculated. The key water quality variables identified 
for 136 lakes for 2010-2015 were turbidity as secchi disk depth (m), chlorophyll a (μg/L), 
total phosphorus as P (μg/L), and (Phenate) Ammonia Nitrogen (NH3 + NH4+) as N 
(μg/L). Table 7 demonstrates the current averages for the four lake water quality variables 
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and the thresholds that would likely result in algae blooms and health of fish populations. 
Chlorophyll a, phosphorus, and nitrogen are above the thresholds for harmful impact.  
 
Table 7. Current Averages and Thresholds for Lake Water Quality Variables 
Water Quality Variable Current Average Threshold 
Turbidity (Secchi depth, meters) 1.08 meters 1 meter 
Chlorophyll a (μg/L) 39.28 µg/L 20-25 µg/L 
Total Phosphorus (μg/L) 108.41 µg/L 35 µg/L 
(Phenate)Ammonia Nitrogen (NH3 + NH4+) (μg/L) 108.52 µg/L 20-40 µg/L 
Sources: (Burkart et al., 2008, 2004; Corporation, 2006; United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
2018) 
 
Additional information on soil type was obtained from the U.S. Natural Resources 
Conservation Service Soil Survey Geographic 2014 and monthly precipitation information 
was gathered from the Iowa State Iowa Environmental Mesonet Climate Monitoring 
Stations. The closest weather station to each lake centroid was used; if there were two 
weather stations that were equidistant then the data was averaged. This information was 
grouped into seasonal precipitation. Information on the location of Confined Animal 
Feeding Operations (CAFOs) was obtained from Iowa Department of Natural Resources 
Animal Feeding Operations Database from 2006 to 2007 as point data. It is assumed that 
the location of the CAFOs is fixed through the study period. 
 
Data on land enrolled in CRP and information on specific conservation practices were 
provided as a geodatabase from the USDA FSA of land that entered into CRP between 
2010 and 2015. Specifically, these were shapefiles of land that entered into CRP through 
general and continuous sign-up each year as well as those whose contracts ended. Amount 
paid to farmers on a per acre per conservation practice per year basis was provided by the 
 46 
USDA FSA. Values were averaged by conservation practice to identify the amount paid to 
farmers per acre on a yearly basis.  
 
Raster level data (30m x 30m) for Iowa on land use cover was obtained from the USDA’s 
National Agricultural Statistics Service. This dataset is a combination of information on 
crops from the USDA and land cover from the USGS National Land Cover Database. 
Shapefiles for lakes and lake watersheds were obtained from the Iowa State Department of 
Natural Resources. All spatial data were converted to a non-spatial format using QGIS and 
Python.  
 
Model Specification 
 
Equation 1. Generalized Model 
 
Log(Ylt) = θlt + β1X1t + β2X2t + β3X3t + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + εlt + εl 
 
Key independent variables were included in the regression analysis. X1t is an acre-based 
variable of the conservation practices. This is key to understanding the role that each 
individual conservation practice has on the lake water quality variables. X2t is land cover 
in acres grouped into seven categories - water, development, corn, other crops, wetlands 
and shrublands, forests and trees, and grass pasture. Soy was omitted as the base for 
analysis. Land cover was included in the model to be able to hold fixed the changes in land 
covers as land is going in and out of CRP practices. Land covers across the landscape have 
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demonstrated both positive and negative impacts on lake water quality (Reed and 
Carpenter, 2002). X3t introduces precipitation (millimeters) that was averaged from 
monthly data. Precipitation was broken up into the four seasons since the frequency and 
duration of precipitation during the year changes greatly. The impact of snow pack in the 
winter months was thought to have a different impact on lake water quality than spring and 
summer rains (Hoering, 2010; Rose et al., 2004). X4 is a dummy variable for the presence 
of concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs). Fertilizer runoff from CAFOs is 
known to contain high levels of nitrogen and phosphorus (Burkholder et al., 2007; Hribar, 
2010). While Iowa has put restrictions in place to regulate the amount of runoff, this 
remains important because of the quantity of operations in the state. This was put in as a 
dummy variable because there is only data on CAFOs for one year. In addition, there is no 
available information on the size of the CAFOs. Soil type (X5) is the dominant soil type on 
a 30m x 30m pixel scale. It is written about consistently in the literature as having an impact 
on lake water quality (Detenbeck ’ et al., 1993; Sharpley, A.N., Chapra, S.C., Wedepohl, 
R., Sims, J.T., Daniel, T.C. and Reddy, 1994) and as such is included as a critical 
independent variable. Soil type may be a proxy for two different variables: 1. The land 
cover that is able to grow on top of a particular soil and 2. The likelihood that a particular 
soil type contributes to an increase or decrease in runoff. Lastly, lake depth (X6), is 
measured in meters, an average of 3 samples during summer annually. It is included since 
it has been identified as a key variable in understanding lake water quality due to mixing 
that occurs within lakes and the distinct limnology of deep versus shallow lakes (University 
of Wisconsin, 2016). In addition, lake depth varies considerably in Iowa. The lakes in 
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northern Iowa near Minnesota are glacial lakes and are much deeper than the manmade 
lakes that exist throughout the rest of the Iowa.  
 
Estimators 
 
For all four water quality variables the Hausman and robust Hausman tests were run. Each 
one rejected the null hypothesis, concluding that the random effects models would not be 
appropriate. A fixed effects approach was utilized focusing on the ‘within’ estimation.  
 
We had reason to believe lags were appropriate to include in our analysis. Oftentimes even 
after a conservation practice is introduced there may be a delay in seeing the results of it, 
particularly for lake water quality (Meals et al., 2010). In addition, water quality variables 
are known to operate on different time scales. For example, phosphorus operates on slower 
time scales than nitrogen. When fertilizer or manure phosphate contacts soil, various 
reactions begin occurring that make the phosphate less soluble and less available (Pagliari 
et al., 2017). 
 
Since the results of fixed effects with a lag are biased and inconsistent, this information 
was not included in the analysis (Nickell, 1981). This led us to investigate the Arellano-
Bond estimator since through Arellano-Bond consistent estimators can be obtained 
utilizing past lags for IV estimation by first differencing (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). In 
order to avoid an endogeneity problem, the differenced unobserved time-invariant 
component of the Arrellano-Bond estimator should be unrelated to the second lag of the 
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dependent variable and the lags thereafter. For the Arellano-Bond estimator the test for the 
critical assumption of no error correlation as well as the test for overidentifying restrictions 
was performed. All water quality variables passed the test for zero autocorrelation. 
Chlorophyll a and turbidity did not pass the test for overidentifying restrictions. 
 
Comparing fixed effects and an Arellano-Bond estimator allowed us to think about the 
impact conservation practices that include grasses versus trees would have on lake water 
quality since it is believed that forest buffer zones over time have the potential to trap as 
much or more sediment as grasses. If we were to assume that dynamics do not matter than 
fixed effects would yield the most useful results and we would focus solely on 
contemporaneous practices.  
 
Fixed effects and Arellano-Bond estimators were utilized to control for the effects of 
spatially omitted variables that influence water quality outcomes.  
 
Results 
 
The detailed results of the fixed effects and Arellano-Bond models are presented in Tables 
8 through 15 reporting coefficients for each measure of water quality and the subsequent 
cost-effectiveness in dollars per microgram per liter or dollars per centimeter of water.  
 
Conservation practices targeting water quality are those designed to have a positive impact 
on water quality. Conservation practices targeting other environmental benefits address 
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erosion, habitat conservation or restoration, or a combination of environmental benefits. It 
is interesting to note that in almost all cases, practices aimed at other environmental 
benefits turn out to be more cost-effective in achieving water quality improvements than 
practices specifically targeting water quality.  
 
Table 8. Phosphorus, Water Quality - Conservation Practices 
  
lntotalP 
Cost-
Effectiveness 
($/µg/L) 
CP# Conservation Practice FE AB FE AB 
Sign-up 
Category 
CP8Aacre 
Grass Waterways, 
Noneasement 
-0.00806*** 
(.0027062) 
-0.0155**** 
(.0028304) 285.25 148.33 
Continuous 
CP27acre 
Farmable Wetlands 
Pilot Wetland  
-0.0341** 
(.0153846)  67.24 
Continuous 
CP29acre 
Marginal Pastureland 
Wildlife Habitat Buffer  
-0.0342**** 
(.006309)  22.41 
Continuous 
CP28acre 
Farmable Wetlands 
Pilot Buffer 
-0.00497* 
(.0029012) 
0.0577** 
(.0291523) 457.52 -39.41 
Continuous 
CP22acre Riparian Buffer  
0.0211**** 
(.0054734)  -59.56 
Continuous 
 
t statistics * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
 
There are five water quality targeted conservation practices that bear a statistically 
significant relationship to changes in phosphorus. Of those, three reduce phosphorus, one 
increases phosphorus, and one flips signs between the fixed effects and the Arellano-Bond 
estimator. Of the three practices that demonstrate a reduction of phosphorus, Marginal 
Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer is the most cost-effective utilizing the Arellano-Bond 
estimator. 
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Table 9. Phosphorus, Other Benefits - Conservation Practices 
  lntotalP 
Cost-Effectiveness 
($/µg/L) 
CP# Conservation Practice FE AB FE AB 
Sign-up 
Category 
CP10acre 
Vegetative Cover – 
Grass – Already 
Established  
0.422** 
(.1898508)  -3.21 
General 
CP4Dacre 
Permanent Wildlife 
Habitat, Noneasement 
0.00434** 
(.0021611) 
0.00957* 
(.0051423) -292.73 -132.75 
General 
CP38Cacre SAFE - Trees 
0.0108* 
(.0062261)  -149.05  
Continuous 
CP42acre Pollinator Habitat 
0.0253**** 
(.0069301) 
0.0378** 
(.0157364) -73.28 -49.05 
General 
and 
Continuous 
CP17acre Living Snow Fence 
0.101 
(.0156219)  -27.87  
Continuous 
CP33acre 
Habitat Buffers for 
Upland Birds  
-0.887** 
(.4054073)  1.99 
Continuous 
CP3Aacre 
Hardwood Tree 
Planting  
-0.0105**** 
(.0022366)  149.68 
General 
CP9acre 
Shallow Water Areas 
for Wildlife 
-0.0162** 
(.0063377) 
-0.0189* 
(.0105352) 116.78 100.10 
Continuous 
 
t statistics * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
 
There are eight conservation practices targeted at other environmental benefits that bear a 
statistically significant relationship to changes in phosphorus. Of those, three are associated 
with reductions in phosphorus and five are associated with increases in phosphorus. Of the 
three practices associated with reductions in phosphorus, Habitat Buffers for Upland Birds 
is the most cost-effective utilizing the Arellano-Bond estimator. 
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Table 10.  Nitrogen, Water Quality - Conservation Practices 
  
 
lntotalN 
Cost-
Effectiveness 
($/µg/L) 
CP # Conservation Practice FE AB FE AB 
Sign-up 
Category 
CP21acre Filter Strips 
-0.0138*** 
(.0048526) 
-0.0233** 
(.00929) 167.45 99.18 
Continuous 
CP28acre 
Farmable Wetlands 
Pilot Buffer  
-0.127** 
(.0575695)  17.89 
Continuous 
CP15Aacre 
Establishment of 
Permanent 
Vegetative Cover 
(Contour Grass 
Strips), Noneasement 
-0.0714**** 
(.0143207) 
-0.0928**** 
(.0202893) 25.41 19.55 
Continuous 
CP29acre 
Marginal Pastureland 
Wildlife Habitat 
Buffer 
-0.119**** 
(.0159608) 
-0.103**** 
(.0172665) 6.43 7.43 
Continuous 
CP22acre Riparian Buffer 
0.0263*** 
(.0094622) 
0.0535** 
(.0222663) -47.74 -23.47 
Continuous 
CP27acre 
Farmable Wetlands 
Pilot Wetland  
0.114*** 
(.0385071)  -20.09 
Continuous 
 
t statistics * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
 
There are six water quality targeted conservation practices that bear a statistically 
significant relationship to changes in nitrogen. Of those, four reduce nitrogen and two 
increase nitrogen. Of the four practices that reduce nitrogen, Marginal Pastureland Wildlife 
Habitat Buffer is the most cost-effective utilizing the Arellano-Bond estimator. 
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Table 11.  Nitrogen, Other Benefits - Conservation Practices 
  
 lntotalN 
Cost-
Effectiveness 
($/µg/L) 
CP # Conservation Practice FE AB FE AB 
Sign-up 
Category 
CP38Cacre SAFE – Trees 
-0.0628**** 
(.014526) 
0.105**** 
(.0394257) 25.61 -15.31 
Continuous 
CP12acre Wildlife Food Plot  
0.157*** 
(.0584005)  -9.20 
General 
CP5Aacre 
Field Windbreak 
Establishment, 
Noneasement  
0.311** 
(.129768)  -7.51 
Continuous 
CP17acre Living Snow Fence 
0.178**** 
(.0453416) 
0.669** 
(.268843) -15.80 -4.20 
Continuous 
CP31acre 
Bottomland Timber 
Establishment on 
Wetlands  
-2.986**** 
(.4467012)  0.77 
Continuous 
CP16Aacre 
Shelterbelt 
Establishment, 
Noneasement  
-1.328**** 
(.1783832)  1.54 
Continuous 
CP38Eacre SAFE – Grass  
-0.0117**** 
(.0020451)  162.87 
Continuous 
CP25acre 
Rare and Declining 
Habitat  
-0.00711** 
(.0031965)  218.52 
General 
CP1acre 
Establishment of 
Permanent 
Introduced Grasses 
and Legumes 
-0.00268** 
(.0011077)  598.24  
General 
 
t statistics * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
 
There are nine conservation practices targeted at other environmental benefits that that bear 
a statistically significant relationship to changes in nitrogen. Of those, five are associated 
with reductions in nitrogen, three are associated with increases in nitrogen, and one flips 
signs between the fixed effects and the Arellano-Bond estimator. Of the five practices that 
are associated with a reduction in nitrogen, Bottomland Timber Establishment on Wetlands 
is the most cost-effective utilizing the Arellano-Bond estimator. 
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Table 12.  Chlorophyll a, Water Quality - Conservation Practices 
  
lnchlorophylla 
Cost-
Effectiveness 
($/µg/L) 
CP# Conservation Practice FE AB FE AB 
Sign-up 
Category 
CP29acre 
Marginal Pastureland 
Wildlife Habitat Buffer 
0.0366**** 
(.010645)  -57.33  
Continuous 
CP23acre Wetland Restoration  
0.0744*** 
(.0238162)  -78.07 
Continuous 
t statistics * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
 
There are two water quality targeted conservation practices that that bear a statistically 
significant relationship to changes in chlorophyll a. Both are associated with an increase in 
chlorophyll a. 
 
Table 13. Chlorophyll a, Other Benefits - Conservation Practices 
  lnchlorophylla 
Cost-Effectiveness 
($/µg/L) 
CP# 
Conservation 
Practice FE AB FE AB 
Sign-up 
Category 
CP2acre 
Establishment of 
Permanent Native 
Grasses  
-0.00345* 
(.0017645)  1,229.81 
General 
CP31acre 
Bottomland Timber 
Establishment on 
Wetlands  
-0.641*** 
(.2258281)  9.88 
Continuous 
CP3Aacre 
Hardwood Tree 
Planting 
-0.0113**** 
(.0020413) 
-0.0175**** 
(.0031915) 380.75 245.85 
General 
CP33acre 
Habitat Buffers for 
Upland Birds  
0.582** 
(.27607)  -8.32 
Continuous 
CP42acre Pollinator Habitat 
-0.0312**** 
(.0077805)  162.67  
Continuous 
and 
General 
CP12acre Wildlife Food Plot 
0.115** 
(.0465478) 
0.144**** 
(.031649) -34.43 -27.50 
General 
CP5Aacre 
Field Windbreak 
Establishment, 
Noneasement 
0.138*** 
(.0414169) 
0.206**** 
(.0312934) -46.36 -31.05 
Continuous 
CP38Cacre SAFE - Trees 
0.0506**** 
(.0086597)  -87.09  
Continuous 
CP9acre 
Shallow Water Areas 
for Wildlife 
0.0345*** 
(.0106725)  -150.11  
Continuous 
t statistics * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
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There are nine conservation practices target at other environmental benefits that bear a 
statistically significant relationship to changes in chlorophyll a. Of those, four are 
associated with reductions in chlorophyll a and five are associated with increases in 
chlorophyll a. Of the four practices associated with a reduction in chlorophyll a, 
Bottomland Timber Establishment on Wetlands is the most cost-effective, utilizing the 
Arellano-Bond estimator. 
 
Table 14. Turbidity, Water Quality - Conservation Practices 
lnsecchidepth Cost-Effectiveness ($/cm) 
CP# 
Conservation 
Practice FE AB FE AB 
Sign-up 
Category 
CP23acre 
Wetland 
Restoration 
-0.00287** 
(.0028684)  528.93  
Continuous 
CP21acre Filter Strips 
-0.00436** 
(.004364)  379.62  
Continuous 
CP27acre 
Farmable 
Wetlands Pilot 
Wetland  -0.0303***  54.14 
Continuous 
CP23Aacre 
Wetland 
Restoration, Non-
Floodplain 
-0.0161**** 
(.0161162)  93.87  
Continuous 
CP29acre 
Marginal 
Pastureland 
Wildlife Habitat 
Buffer 
-0.0319*** 
(.0318874) -0.0346**** 17.19 15.85 
Continuous 
CP22acre Riparian Buffer  0.0132**  -68.12 Continuous 
t statistics * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
 
There are six water quality targeted conservation practices that bear a statistically 
significant relationship to changes in turbidity. Of those, five reduce turbidity and one 
increases turbidity. Of the five practices that reduce turbidity, Marginal Pastureland 
Wildlife Habitat Buffer is the most cost-effective utilizing the Arellano-Bond estimator. 
The change in depth is related to the increase in visibility for every centimeter of water. 
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Table 15.  Turbidity, Other Benefits - Conservation Practices 
 lnsecchidepth 
Cost-Effectiveness 
($/cm) 
CP# 
Conservation 
Practice FE AB FE AB 
Sign-up 
Category 
CP25acre 
Rare and 
Declining 
Habitat 
-0.0013* 
(.001296)  856  
General 
CP3Aacre 
Hardwood 
Tree Planting 
-0.00749*** 
(.007493) 
-0.0118**** 
(.001871) 150.13 95.3 
General 
CP31acre 
Bottomland 
Timber 
Establishment 
on Wetlands 
-0.143**** 
(.143212) 
-0.352**** 
(.0964039) 11.57 4.70 
Continuous 
CP38Cacre SAFE - Trees 
0.0908**** 
(-.0908427)  -12.68  
Continuous 
CP5Aacre 
Field 
Windbreak 
Establishment, 
Noneasement 
0.105**** 
(-.1054222) 
0.127**** 
(.0237566) -15.92 -13.17 
Continuous 
CP42acre 
Pollinator 
Habitat 
0.0226**** 
(-.0226005) 
0.0316* 
(.016221) -58.7 -41.98 
General and 
Continuous 
CP17acre 
Living Snow 
Fence 
0.0330** 
(-.0329907)  -61.02  
Continuous 
CP10acre 
Vegetative 
Cover – Grass 
– Already 
Established 
0.00416* 
(.0022607)  -233.12  
General 
t statistics * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
 
There are eight conservation practices aimed at other environmental benefits that are 
significantly associated with changes in turbidity. Of those, three are associated with 
reductions in turbidity and five are associated with increases in turbidity. Of the three 
practices associated with reductions in turbidity, Bottomland Timber Establishment on 
Wetlands is the most cost-effective utilizing the Arellano-Bond estimator. 
 
Discussion 
 
Using estimates of the marginal impact of a change in land area committed to the various 
CRP practices on three main water quality indicators, we calculated the cost of moving 
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each indicator by a small amount. This provides a partial assessment of the cost-
effectiveness of the practice. Many practices are aimed at a mix of environmental benefits, 
and there is nothing that can be said about their cost-effectiveness in achieving targets other 
than for water quality. The cost of meeting one of a number of outcomes targeted by a 
conservation practice does not indicate whether the practice is otherwise good or bad. An 
additional caveat is that many practices apply only in a limited set of conditions—along 
watercourses, field margins, around wetlands, etc. So, although a practice might, on 
average, be the most cost-effective at achieving an improvement in one or more water 
quality measures, it might not be an option under most conditions.  
 
It is also important to keep in mind just how much this analysis can tell us. Since we used 
a unit increment in water quality we are only looking at where the marginal acres are 
occurring. Cost-effectiveness may change as you improve water quality using a specific 
conservation practice leading to diminishing marginal cost-effectiveness. This all depends 
on the relative size of the area under each conservation practice and how much candidate 
land is available for expansion. 
 
The range of costs identified is very wide—certainly much wider than might be expected 
from differences in payments made for various practices. Nor was a match found between 
practices thought to have the greatest impact on water quality and cost-effectiveness. It was 
found, however, that practices that were cost-effective for one indicator tended to be cost-
effective for other indicators. Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer was found to 
be the most cost-effective among the practices specifically targeting water quality at 
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delivering improvements in all three indicators. Bottomland Timber Establishment on 
Wetlands was found to be the most cost-effective among practices targeting a wider range 
of environmental benefits at delivering improvements in two of the three indicators (Table 
16).  
 
Table 16. Most Cost-Effective Conservation Practices 
Water Quality CP # Conservation Practice Amount 
(US$) 
Water Quality Benefit 
Phosphorus 29 Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer 22.41 µg/L 
Nitrogen 29 Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer 7.43 µg/L 
Turbidity 29 Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer 15.85 cm 
Other Benefits 
Phosphorus 33 Habitat Buffers for Upland Birds 1.99 µg/L 
Nitrogen 31 Bottomland Timber Establishment on Wetlands 0.77 µg/L 
Turbidity 31 Bottomland Timber Establishment on Wetlands 4.70 cm 
  
These estimates may be used to calculate the minimum cost of achieving any targeted 
change in water quality.  For example, the current average phosphorus load is 39.28 µg/L 
while the threshold is 25 µg/L. The lowest cost of moving an average lake back to the 
threshold using Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffers would be $320.01/acre.  
 
Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer is part of the continuous sign-up of the CRP; 
farmers can enroll at any time and it is not subject to the EBI. According to the FSA CRP 
Handbook, the objectives of the practice are to: “remove nutrients, sediment, organic 
matter, pesticides, and other pollutants from surface runoff and subsurface flow by 
deposition, absorption, plant uptake, denitrification, and other processes, and thereby 
reduce pollution and protect surface water and subsurface water quality while enhancing 
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the ecosystem of the water body” (United States Department of Agriculture Farm Service 
Agency, 2015). The conservation practice involves a strip of vegetation between 20 and 
120 feet adjacent or parallel to a seasonal stream, a perennial stream, wetlands, or a 
permanent water body. It comprises native grasses, wildflowers, and shrubs to intercept 
sediment, nutrients, and pesticides. Cropland, forestland, and woodland are not eligible for 
marginal pastureland, meaning that this practice is not impacting the most productive land. 
 
While Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffers are the most cost-effective of the 
practices targeting water quality, two conservation practices targeting multiple benefits, 
rather than water quality alone, were actually less costly: Bottomland Timber 
Establishment on Wetlands and Habitat Buffers for Upland Birds. An increase in Habitat 
Buffers for Upland Birds at $1.99/acre would lead to a decrease in phosphorus of 1 µg/L, 
costing $28.42/acre to return to the phosphorus threshold. An increase in Bottomland 
Timber Establishment on Wetlands at $.77/acre would lead to a decrease in nitrogen of 1 
µg/L. All of these practices are only options for farms with certain physical features.  
 
Bottomland Timber Establishment on Wetlands is focused on reforestation in wetlands, 
providing shelter for waterfowl and wildlife as well as controlling flooding, soil erosion, 
and pollution. According to the FSA CRP Handbook, Bottomland Timber Establishment 
on Wetlands is meant to establish and provide long-term viability of a bottomland 
hardwood stand of trees, and control erosion, reduce pollution, restore and enhance 
wetlands, promote carbon sequestration, and provide wildlife habitat (United States 
Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2015).  
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Habitat Buffers for Upland Birds is intended to provide food and cover for quail and upland 
birds in cropland areas with secondary benefits of reducing erosion, increase soil and water 
quality, and protecting and enhancing on-farm ecosystems. It can have a minimum width 
of 30 feet and a maximum width of 120 feet (United States Department of Agriculture 
Farm Service Agency, 2015).This conservation practice is really not targeted at water but 
ends up having a positive impact on phosphorus. According to the NRCS Habitat Buffers 
for Upland Birds Program Sheet, habitat buffers for upland birds are strips of vegetation 
established around the edges of crop fields to provide habitat for bobwhite quail, ring-neck 
pheasant, and other upland birds.  
 
Buffers can be established around field edges on any eligible cropland. They can be planted 
along one or more sides of a field, however establishing a buffer around the entire field is 
highly encouraged. It is considered year-round habitat, and as such, should be considered 
“hands off” from any farming operations. It also supports diverse vegetation, which are 
more likely to uptake phosphorus (United States Department of Agriculture Farm Service 
Agency, 2015). In design, Habitat Buffers for Upland Birds is quite similar to CP29: it acts 
as a grass buffer around farmland. Both are part of the continuous sign-up process, allowing 
farmers to enroll at any time and not subject to the EBI.  
 
What was surprising is that a number of conservation practices expected to be cost-
effective in improving water quality were not. CP15A, CP8A, and CP21 are the three water 
targeted conservation practices expected to be at least relatively cost-effective. Each has 
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expanded dramatically between 2010 and 2015. We found CP15A (Establishment of 
Permanent Vegetative Cover, Contour Grass Strips, Noneasement) to be significant for 
nitrogen at $19.55/µg/L under Arellano-Bond and at $25.41/µg/L under fixed effects. The 
practice is part of the continuous sign-up and meant to establish strips of permanent 
vegetative cover following the contour on eligible cropland alternated with wider cultivated 
strips. It is meant to reduce erosion and control runoff yet had little impact on turbidity. 
CP8A (Grass Waterways, Noneasement) is only significant for phosphorus at 
$148.33/µg/L under Arellano-Bond and $285.25/µg/L under fixed effects. Through 
continuous sign-up, its goal is to improve water quality by establishing grass waterways to 
convey runoff from terraces, diversions, or other water concentrations without causing 
erosion or flooding.  
 
Based on the literature, we would also have expected CP21 (Filter Strips) to have a large 
impact on water quality and to be cost-effective. Yet, CP21 was significantly associated 
with improvements in water quality only for nitrogen at $99.18/µg/L under Arellano-Bond 
and $167.45/µg/L under fixed effects, and so was cost-ineffective for both. It was also 
significant for turbidity at $379.62/meter under fixed effects—again cost-ineffective—but 
not for phosphorus or chlorophyll a. While Filter Strips, like other practices that take land 
out of cultivation, may well satisfy the criterion of additionality (Claassen et al., 2018), and 
may have a relatively low opportunity cost to farmers, there was no evidence that they are 
able to improve water quality cost effectively.  
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Among habitat focused conservation practices, CP42 (Pollinator Habitat) increased by 15 
times between 2010 and 2015.  It was associated with statistically significant improvements 
in phosphorus at 49.05/µg/L under Arellano-Bond and $73.28/µg/L under fixed effects and 
in chlorophyll a at $162.67/µg/L under fixed effects, but it was also found to be associated 
with statistically significant deterioration in turbidity. It is the only conservation practice 
that exists in both general and continuous sign-up. 
 
For conservation practices with multiple environmental benefits CP1, CP2, and CP3A all 
increased between six and eight times over the study period. CP1 (Establishment of 
Permanent Introduced Grasses and Legumes) is one of the oldest conservation practices 
and was only significant for nitrogen at $598.24/µg/L under fixed effects. CP1 is meant to 
establish or maintain existing permanent introduced grasses and legumes and is part of the 
general sign-up but can fall under continuous sign-up in approved wellhead protection 
areas. CP2 (Establishment of Permanent Native Grasses) is also one of the oldest 
conservation practices and was only significant for chlorophyll at $1,229.81/µg/L under 
Arellano-Bond. CP2 is meant to establish or maintain existing vegetative cover of native 
grasses and is part of the general sign-up but can fall under continuous sign-up in approved 
wellhead protection areas. Lastly, CP3A (Hardwood Tree Planting) was significant for 
turbidity, chlorophyll a, and phosphorus – turbidity at $9,529.58/meter under Arellano-
Bond and $15,013.22/meter under fixed effects, chlorophyll at $245.85/µg/L under 
Arellano-Bond and $380.75/µg/L under fixed effects, and phosphorus at $149.68/µg/L 
under Arellano-Bond. CP3A is meant to establish and maintain a new stand or an existing 
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stand of predominantly hardwood trees in a timber planting. It is also part of the general 
sign-up unless in a wellhead protection area when it is eligible for continuous sign-up. 
 
The water and multiple environmental benefits conservation practices that we would have 
thought would have been cost-effective that were not are all part of the general sign-up. 
One challenge with the EBI for general sign-up is that the assignation of points is informed 
by, but does not rely on, measures of the ecosystem services that cropland retirement may 
provide. This assignation is based on a mixture of expert opinion, scientific data, and 
stakeholder inputs (Hellerstein, 2017). 
 
Among our most surprising findings is a statistically significant but negative relationship 
between CP22 (Riparian Buffers) and three of the four water quality variables. Riparian 
Buffers and Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffers, the most cost-effective of the 
practices targeted at water quality, are defined exactly the same except for one thing: CP22 
utilizes trees for restoration while CP29 utilizes grasses. There are three potential 
explanations for the perverse relationship between Riparian Buffers and water quality: 1. 
Riparian Buffers do reduce runoff, but net flows are increasing for other reasons. This 
could happen if Riparian Buffers were being added to areas where runoff is rapidly 
increasing due to processes not reflected in our data. 2. Riparian Buffers increase runoff in 
the short term. When trees are planted there may be short term effects due to the removal 
of existing vegetation.  3. Riparian Buffers increase runoff in the long term. Planting trees 
along rivers and streambanks is primarily for the purpose of stabilization of streambanks 
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and the provision of habitat for aquatic organisms and wildlife, the loss of understory 
results in increased runoff. 
 
According to the NRCS Riparian Buffer Conservation Plan, riparian forest buffers are 
normally established concurrently with other practices as part of a resource management 
system for a conservation management unit. For example, adjoining streambanks or 
shorelines must be stabilized before or in conjunction with the establishment of the buffer 
(streambank and shoreline protection). To maintain proper functioning of a planting, 
excessive water flows and erosion must be controlled upslope of the riparian forest buffer 
(filter strip, diversion, critical area planting, residue management). 
 
On the job sheet for Riparian Buffers there are actually three purposes noted: 1. Create 
shade to lower water temperature to improve aquatic habitat; 2. Provide detritus and large 
woody debris for aquatic and terrestrial organisms; and 3. Remove nutrients, sediment, 
organic matter, pesticides and other pollutants from surface runoff and subsurface flow to 
reduce pollution and protect surface water and subsurface water quality. Water quality 
improvement is not the primary goal of CP22 (Riparian Buffers). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Four main conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. 
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The first conclusion is that a lexicographic ranking can be applied to CRP conservation 
practices. This is a useful process that can be utilized to look at cost-effectiveness of these 
practices. This chapter included all conservation practices, both those in general and 
continuous sign-up. The most cost-effective practices were all part of the continuous sign-
up process. According to Hellerstein (2017), “There is little research considering the 
effectiveness of continuous sign-up.” In addition to the lack of a competitive mechanism, 
continuous sign-up (by design) focuses on parcels that tend to do one thing very well. If 
the proportion of CRP in continuous sign-up increases, this is likely to lead to forgoing 
enrollment of acreage that does a number of things well, but nothing “very well”—the kind 
of acres that an EBI will identify (Hellerstein, 2017). This should be taken into account 
went considering a sole focus on improving water quality.  
 
The second conclusion is that practices can be identified for which the data suggests there 
is an impact on physical effectiveness. Both positive and negative impacts on key water 
quality variables were identified for various conservation practices. This is an essential 
component for calculating the cost-effectiveness of the conservation practices.  
 
The third conclusion is that due to the restrictions on the implementation of individual 
conservation practices, it may be necessary to look at conservation practices that are not 
the most cost-effective. For example, Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer is only 
applicable where there is pasture and not cropland. In this case, utilizing the ranking of 
cost-effectiveness, looking to the next most cost-effective practice could be useful for 
cropland areas. 
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Agri-environmental programs produce environmental gain only when the practices funded 
would not be adopted without the incentive provided by the program (Smith and Weinberg, 
2004). According to Claassen et al. (2014), for structural practices (e.g., grass waterways, 
riparian buffers), it is relatively easy to establish that a practice has not already been 
installed. For management practices (e.g., conservation tillage, nutrient management), 
however, it may be difficult or impossible to confirm that a practice is being adopted for 
the first time. Additionality is always a concern when thinking about land retirement 
programs, since one would think that it would be in the farmers best interest to enroll 
marginal land. Lubowski (2003) suggests that about 15% of the land enrolled in the CRP 
would have shifted to a non-crop land use in any case. 
 
Lack of additionality in CRP practices can be seen by the lack of cost-effectiveness. Both 
practices that are really expensive in the right direction (improving water quality) or in the 
wrong direction (worsening water quality) are unlikely to be additional. 
 
Lastly, it is important to note that there were many conservation practices that did not 
demonstrate significance, showing no impact or negative impact on water quality. For 
those practices, there is a need for additional tests to further demonstrate cost-effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 4: CRP PRACTICES AND FARMER DECISION MAKING 
 
Introduction 
 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), like many other agri-environment schemes, is 
voluntary. Farmers cannot be compelled to participate. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand how farmers’ voluntary decisions to enroll in conservation practices, and what 
conservation practices in which to enroll, are shaped by a range of farm characteristics, 
time-varying factors, and the specific features of individual conservation practices. 
 
Different factors affect decision making for participation in the CRP. Farmers are 
presumably choosing to enroll land into CRP as opposed to the next best alternative based 
in large part on the opportunity cost of the land. The determinants of opportunity cost are 
therefore extremely important.  
 
In an ideal world one might know the opportunity cost directly through a recent sale of the 
land on the agricultural land market or be able to estimate the opportunity cost through a 
farmland hedonic price function analysis. For example, Bastian et al. (2002) utilize GIS 
measures to estimate the impact of amenity and agricultural production land characteristics 
on price per acre for a sample of Wyoming agricultural parcels2. However, due to absence 
of data on land transactions the hedonic method cannot be used to value the opportunity 
                                               
2 They identify that remote agricultural lands, including wildlife habitat and scenic vistas, command higher prices per 
hectare in Wyoming than those whose landscape is dominated by agricultural production. 
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cost of agricultural lands in Iowa. Therefore, we must rely upon indirect measures of the 
quality of the land endowment as the proximate drivers of opportunity cost, including 
variables such as erodibility, corn suitability, and land cover. For example, low levels of 
erodibility may lead to low enrollment in CRP; a farmer would want to utilize high quality, 
flat soil to maximize production of crops. 
 
The literature is replete with studies assessing the factors which influence farmers’ 
adoption of conservation practices (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Hynes and Garvey, 2009; 
Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Prokopy et al., 2008). Some of this literature has specifically 
explored farmers’ willingness to participate in agri-environmental programs (Mishra and 
Khanal, 2013). Purvis et al. (1989) examined farmers’ willingness to participate in a filter 
strip program and showed that their decisions were determined by the yearly conservation 
practice payments, perceptions of environmental change, and farm opportunity cost. Loftus 
and Kraft (2003) reported that farmers who rely less on farm-generated income as a 
percentage of total household income, and those informed about the eligibility of their land 
for the CRP tended to be more willing to participate in CRP involving filter strips. 
 
The main driver of participation in CRP is farmers seeking to maximize their return per 
acre. Stern et al. (2012) conducted an analysis of the main crops in Iowa and land moving 
in and out of CRP. They utilized a county level analysis across Iowa’s 99 counties. Since 
they did not have access to farm level data on enrollment in CRP, as we do, they used the 
USDA NASS to calculate acreage estimates for each crop by county using surveys 
conducted by NASS. The amount of land enrolled in CRP was determined by the amount 
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of money appropriated for CRP. As prices for corn increased, farmers removed some land 
from CRP and put the land back into crop production – as would be expected if they were 
making decisions based on their expected opportunity cost. 
 
Patterns of farmer participation in CRP impact the effectiveness of the program. As of 
October 2001, CRP was not very effective in targeting environmentally sensitive land, and 
enrollment in many states was very low in the continuous CRP, where enrollment is 
ongoing (Senate, 2002). An understanding of the factors that motivate farmers to 
participate in CRP is helpful to policy makers in improving the design and implementation 
in order to encourage cost-effectiveness (Yang and Isik, 2004). 
 
To date, no analysis looks at farmers’ enrollment decisions across individual conservation 
practices. Past work has focused on characteristics that lead to the enrollment in the CRP 
but have ignored the choice of which practices to enroll in. Given the evidence offered in 
the previous chapter that the practices differ considerably in targeted services, physical 
effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness, this is a notable oversight. Theoretically farmers have 
forty-eight different conservation practices to choose from. The complexity of having two 
sign-up types, general and continuous, creates an initial dichotomy since continuous 
practices can be enrolled in at any point relatively easily while farmers seeking enrollment 
in general practices are selected through a periodic reverse auction. In addition, some 
conservation practices utilize marginal land while others actually remove productive land 
from use. Grouping such heterogeneous practices together is not an effective way to 
understand the means in which farm-level heterogeneity, such as land cover type, corn 
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suitability, and levels of erodibility, may cause farmers to make substantially different 
enrollment decisions.  
 
Our model looks at the question of substitution between alternative practices, conditional 
on a farmer deciding to commit some of their land to a specific CRP practice. Section 2 
provide background on the changes in the CRP in Iowa, enrollment practices, and how they 
were impacted by the market. Section 3 explains the three major groups of characteristics, 
and six relevant hypotheses associated with our analysis. Section 4 discusses the result of 
four models of increasing complexity, multinomial models with and without alternative 
specific constants. It also provides a discussion of how our hypotheses faired against our 
results. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for CRP managers and opportunities 
for future research.  
 
Background 
 
There are currently two ways farmers can sign-up to participate in the CRP: ‘general sign-
up’ and ‘continuous sign-up’. General sign-up includes mechanisms designed to assure 
cost-effective provision of services of uncertain value. Continuous sign-up has no 
mechanisms for cost-effectiveness but is restricted to services thought to be of high value.  
 
Across the United States as a whole, the dominant form of sign-up is general. General sign-
up has pre-announced enrollment periods. During sign-up, farmers submit offers for the 
amounts they are willing to accept to enroll acreage in the CRP. County NRCS offices 
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calculate the maximum acceptable rental rate for the acreage being submitted (maximum 
payment rate) and offers are ranked at the national office using an environmental benefits 
index (EBI). According to the Farm Service Agency (FSA), offers selected are those that 
provide the greatest environmental benefits considering the cost of enrolling the acreage in 
the program (United States Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2015).  
 
For continuous sign-up, farmers can enroll at any time. The practices available during 
continuous sign-up generally provide high environmental benefits to large areas when 
compared to the acreage on which the practice is implemented. The continuous sign-up 
process does not have a competitive evaluation process, and aims to enroll small, 
environmentally sensitive areas and target acreage (United States Department of 
Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2015). The presumption is that continuous practices 
generate disproportionate benefits and as such do not need to go through a more formal 
process (R. Iovanna, personal communication, April 26, 2018).  
 
Our analysis divides CRP contracts into four groups: two types of sign-up (continuous and 
general) and two types of practices (ones that take productive land out of use and ones that 
take unproductive land out of use). While total contracts and acres in CRP in Iowa had an 
overall decrease over our time series, 2010 to 2015, (Figure 8), there were more dramatic 
changes in the categories of contracts. Specifically looking at the top 25 practices, 85% of 
overall contracts, the number of new contracts or renewals signed fluctuated, with a high 
level of sign-up across all practices in 2011, particularly practices that went through general 
sign-up and contracted on unproductive land. This is likely the result of the percentage of 
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practices that the FSA chose to accept through the reverse auction that year. Practices that 
went through continuous sign-up and took land out of production stayed relatively constant 
over the time series, while practices that went through continuous sign-up and took out 
unproductive land gradually decreased. These changes are a motivating factor for how 
sign-up and the type of land under contract have an impact on decision making. 
 
Figure 8. CRP Enrollment by Farm and Enrollment Type: New and Renewed 
Contracts (2010-2015). Note that the data for 2015 are incomplete. 
 
 
Looking at specific conservation practices (Figure 9), there are significant changes in sign-
up during the 2010 to 2015 time series. In 2008 there was a major increase in CP10, Grass 
Already Established. In 2011 there was a major increase in CP10 and CP2, at the same 
time there was a major increase in overall land enrolled. Most notably CP25, Rare and 
Declining Habitat, had a high level of sign-up, where it had been low the previous three 
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years. Two changes occurred around that time: 1. Sign-up 32, REX extension starting in 
2006 and 2. General sign-up 33 in 2006 (Bennett, 2011). 
 
Figure 9. Enrollment (Shares) in CRP Practices by Year 
 
 
Between 2007 and 2010 many CRP contracts across the United States, upwards of 28 
million acres, were set to expire (Figure 10). In order to lessen the impact, in 2006 the FSA 
offered holders of contracts set to expire the opportunity to re-enroll or extend their 
contracts. This was known as REX. Sign-up 32 denotes early re-enrollment of 2007-2010 
expiring general sign-up contracts under the 2006 REX offer (Appendix D). Holders of 
approximately 82% of expiring contract acres were approved for re-enrollment or 
extension (USDA Farm Service Agency, 2007). 
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Figure 10. CRP Contracts Set to Expire and Expired CRP Land 
 
 
Also, in 2006, the total number of CRP contracts for the state of Iowa went up and the total 
acres in CRP in Iowa went down during the time period when there was an increase in corn 
prices (Figure 11). After 2006 the number of contracts and number of acres mirror each 
other, with a decrease between 2006 and 2014, steadily increasing after 2014 to present. 
 
Figure 11. Iowa CRP: Total Contracts and Total Acres 
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Farmers utilize corn futures to make decisions about whether to continue to keep their land 
in productivity or enroll in CRP. We may therefore expect the FSA, which establishes the 
prices for continuous practices and accepts contracts for the general sign-up, to adjust CRP 
practice prices with corn futures. Yet the FSA utilizes a 3-year average county rental rate 
to establish CRP payment levels. This means that the CRP prices are likely to respond to 
movements in corn futures prices in a sluggish manner. Figure 12 demonstrates just that. 
The black line represents continuous corn futures. There was a sharp rise and then decrease 
of corn futures between 2010 and 2015. Corn futures begin diminishing in 2013. 
 
Figure 12 looks at the fourteen conservation practices out of the top twenty-five chosen by 
farmers that went through continuous sign-up alongside the change in corn futures. The 
colored lines in Figure 12 represent the average payment for individual practices in each  
year. We would expect the price of conservation practices to go up when corn futures rise, 
yet this is not the overall trend across the practices. The 3-year average county rental rate 
used to establish CRP payment levels created a lag compared to markets, particularly in 
2013, which took a long time to correct. This is not beneficial for the competitiveness of 
CRP with crops during times of rising corn/soy prices and can result in “overpaying” 
during periods of falling corn/soy prices (Personal communication, Curt Goettsch, FSA). 
 
There are few peer reviewed articles that look at the impact of the change in corn futures 
on CRP, none of which look at specific CRP practices. One article estimates a significant, 
negative correlation between corn spot prices and CRP enrollment, which is what we would 
expect (Gill-Austern, 2011). They suggest that corn spot prices become more significant 
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as the time lag grows larger. Prices are initially insignificant with a time lag of one year, 
significant at the 10 percent level with a time lag of two years, significant at the 5 percent 
level with a time lag of three years and significant at the 1 percent level when unobserved 
state statistics are taken into account with a time lag of three years (Gill-Austern, 2011). 
 
Figure 12. Corn Futures and Continuous Conservation Practices 
 
Source: (Quandl, 2019) 
 
Data and Methods 
 
In order to understand farmer decision making we have specified and estimated a CRP 
enrollment choice model. Variables included in the model can be broken into three groups: 
75
125
175
225
275
325
375
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1/2/08 1/2/09 1/2/10 1/2/11 1/2/12 1/2/13 1/2/14 1/2/15 1/2/16 1/2/17 1/2/18 1/2/19
$/
he
ct
ar
e
Ce
nt
s/b
us
he
l
Corn Settle CP15A CP16A CP17A
CP21 CP22 CP23 CP23A
CP27 CP28 CP29 CP30
 77 
farm characteristics, time-varying characteristics, and practice characteristics (Tables 18 
and 19). 
 
Farm characteristics include corn suitability rating (CSR), land cover, and erodibility. CSR 
acts as an indication of how likely the land is to be put into production. CSR data were 
obtained from the Iowa State University Extension at a 30m to 30m pixel level for all land 
in Iowa for 99 counties from 2010 to 2015. CSR was binned into 5 categories: very poor, 
poor, good, very good, excellent (Personal communication, Dr. C. Lee Burras, Professor 
of Agronomy at Iowa State University). This was later combined into three measures: bad 
(very poor and poor), average (good), and good (very good and excellent). CSR was 
aggregated based on the average per farm. 
 
Land cover is important since specific conservation practices can only be implemented on 
certain land types, such as wetlands for marginal land, grasslands for bird habitat, etc. 
Current land cover also provides an indication of the opportunity cost of the land, i.e. by 
whether or not a substantial share of acreage is currently in intensive agriculture or not. As 
in previous chapters, land cover shares were grouped into eight different categories: corn, 
soy, water, developed, grasslands, wetlands, forest, and miscellaneous. Soy was always 
omitted as the base category, so all land cover results are in reference to soy. 
 
Raster level data for Iowa on land use cover were obtained from the USDA’s National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). This dataset is a combination of information on 
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crops from the USDA and land cover from the USGS National Land Cover Database 
(NLCD). All spatial data were converted to a non-spatial format using QGIS and Python.  
 
The erodibility of land effects whether it is likely to be marginal land or good for sustained 
production. Highly erodible land (HEL) is measured by the most dominant erodibility type 
on a farm. Soil map units and an erodibility index (EI) are used as the basis for identifying 
HEL. A soil map unit with an EI of 8 or more is designated as HEL. The EI of a soil map 
unit is determined by dividing the potential erodibility for each soil map unit by the soil 
loss tolerance value established for the soil. A soil map unit with an EI less than 8 is non-
highly erodible land (NHEL) (USDA, 2013). Data were obtained from the NRCS Natural 
Resources Inventory at the 30m to 30m pixel level for all land in Iowa for 99 counties from 
2010 to 2015. Erodibility was aggregated based on the average per farm. 
 
Table 17 demonstrates the land cover types associated with the three classes of erodibility. 
All erodibility classes include both cultivated and non-cultivated land. 41% of NHEL is in 
land that is being cultivated (corn and soy), while 30% of HEL is in land that is being 
cultivated (corn and soy). The main land covers in areas not under cultivation are grass and 
forest. Undetermined erodibility (UHEL) is mostly land that is not in cultivation, with 70% 
in grasslands and forest. We expect HEL land to be more steeply sloped than NHEL land. 
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Table 17. Land Cover Associated with Erosion Categories 
Erodibility Type % Corn % Soy % Grassland % Forest % Developed 
HEL 17 13 49 9 0 
NHEL 26 15 44 0 6 
UHEL 11 7 58 12 0 
 
Time-varying characteristics look at two measurements of corn futures: year-long average 
and year-long coefficient of variation (CV). Corn futures are utilized by farmers to make 
costly commitments about what to do with their land. Since CRP contracts are for 10 to 15 
years, corn futures act as a useful tool to think about how much a farmer could profit from 
keeping his or her land in production versus enrolling in CRP and receive a fixed payment 
per year for 10 to 15 years without adjustment. 
 
Information on continuous corn futures was sourced from the Chicago Market Exchange. 
Continuous corn futures are multiple futures combined creating a daily average value, 
regardless of when the corn futures were initiated. In actuality there are five corn futures 
contracts scheduled for each year—with deliveries in March, May, July, September, and 
December. December is the new-crop contract, whereas the other four contracts trade the 
harvest of the preceding year. Average yearly corn futures take the average of the daily 
corn future quotes for each year for a ten-year period and the CV for corn futures takes the 
ratio of the annual standard deviation to the mean and shows the extent of volatility in 
relation to the mean of the annual corn futures.  
 
Utilizing the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index key monetary variables were 
deflated to 2010, including CRP payment and corn futures (U.S. Bureau of Economic 
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Analysis, 2019). In addition, these variables were standardized, rescaled to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one.  
 
Table 18. Farm and Time-Varying Characteristics Variables 
Data Sources: (Quandl, 2019; USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2018) 
 
We are only examining farms that chose the top 25 conservation practices during 2010 to 
2015. We do not observe decisions of non-participants of CRP in our data.  
 
The unit of analysis was a farm, measured in acres. Farms could consist of one to several 
parcels. For those farms that had more than one practice the primary practice was utilized, 
 Mean Variance Min Max 
FARM CHARACTERISTICS 
Corn Suitability Rating (CSR) 
Bad .0684281 .0637458 0 1 
Average .4322893 .2454158 0 1 
Good .4992826 .25 0 1 
Land Cover 
Soy .1347688 .054227 0 1 
Corn .2080725 .0767675 0 1 
Water .0044161 .0008638 0 1 
Developed .0432057 .0122186 0 1 
Grasslands .4757453 .101065 0 1 
Forests .0683465 .0192219 0 1 
Wetlands .0264519 .0264519 0 1 
Miscellaneous .0303542 .0083149 0 1 
Erodibility 
Highly erodible Land .5566155 .2467951 0 1 
Not Highly Erodible Land .4016583 .2403293 0 1 
Undetermined .0417261 .0399851 0 1 
TIME-VARYING CHARACTERISTICS 
Corn Futures 
Year-long average 561.4383 14269.71 376.7768 694.8879 
Year-long CV 14.16356 32.08671 4.354174 20.88397 
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meaning the most prevalent conservation practice on a farm by acreage. For all farms, 85% 
had land in only one conservation practice. These 25 practices can be broken down into 
which fall under general vs. continuous sign-up and practices that take land out of 
production and those that do not (Table 19). 
 
Data on conservation practice payments includes extensions and renewals as well as new 
contracts. The chosen practice by each farmer has a CRP payment that is the real marginal 
value. For the 24 other non-chosen practices the payment per practice was calculated from 
the average of all new contracts per year for that particular practice.  
 
Data on land enrolled in CRP was provided as a geodatabase from the USDA of land that 
entered into CRP between 2010 and 2015, both new contracts and re-enrollments. 
Specifically, these were shapefiles of land that entered into CRP through general and 
continuous sign-up each year.  
 
Conservation practice characteristics include annual average payment amount, sign-up 
type, and practices that take productive or unproductive land out of use. Practice payment 
amount varies considerably within and between practices that go through continuous and 
general sign-up. Practice sign-up type, general and continuous, have different enrollment 
processes, which change the nature of the enrollment decision. For example, farmers 
enrolling in continuous practices are price takers while general enrollment practices utilize 
a reverse auction that selects on a lower price. 
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Whether practices take productive land out of use versus operating on marginal or 
unproductive land is one of the most critical factors for deciding to enroll in CRP. If a 
farmer is going to take out land that could be good for production, it will likely require a 
much larger financial incentive than if the practice requires him or her to enroll marginal 
land into CRP. No study to date has looked at the difference between practices that take 
land out of production versus those that do not. This information is not readily available 
from the USDA. It was obtained from an expert at the FSA in Iowa based on over two 
decades of experience working with farmers and the CRP (Personal communication, Curt 
Goettsch, FSA).  
 
Table 19. Top 25 Practice Characteristics 
Conservation Practice Mean 
General or 
Continuous  
Taking 
land out of 
production 
or not  
 
(P, NP) (G or C) 
* 21 Filter Strips 0.277 C P 
8A Grass Waterway, Noneasement 0.140 C NP 
25 Rare and Declining Habitat 0.102 G NP 
1 Established Permanent Introduced Grasses and 
Legumes 0.095 G P 
2 Established Permanent Native Grasses 0.081 G P 
4D Permanent Wildlife Habitat, Noneasement 0.067 G NP 
23 Wetland Restoration 0.048 C NP 
22 Riparian Buffer 0.032 C P 
10 Vegetative Cover, Grass Already Established 0.028 G NP 
38E SAFE Grass 0.026 C NP 
9 Shallow Water Areas for Wildlife 0.019 C NP 
15A Established Contour Grass Strips, 
Noneasement 0.018 C P 
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28 Farmable Wetlands Program, Buffer 0.017 C NP 
3A Hardwood Tree Planting 0.013 G NP 
33 Habitat Buffers for Upland Birds 0.009 C NP 
16A Shelterbelt Establishment, Noneasement 0.008 C NP 
5A Field Windbreak, Noneasement 0.004 C NP 
29 Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer 0.003 C NP 
27 Farmable Wetlands Program, Wetland 0.003 C NP 
31 Bottomland Timber Establishment on 
Wetlands 0.003 C NP 
23A Wetland Restoration, Nonfloodplain 0.003 C NP 
38C SAFE Trees 0.002 C NP 
11 Vegetative Cover, Trees Already Established 0.002 G NP 
17A Living Snow Fence, Noneasement 0.001 C NP 
30 Marginal Pastureland Wetland Buffer 0.001 C NP 
* Base 
 
Discrete choice studies are based on a random utility maximization (RUM) framework 
where the landowner will switch from one use to another if the net expected returns from 
doing so, minus conversion costs, exceed the returns from the alternative uses (McFadden, 
1981). Discrete choice models specify the probability that an individual chooses an option 
among a set of alternatives. In practice, we cannot know all factors affecting individual 
choice decisions as their determinants are partially observed or imperfectly measured. 
Therefore, discrete choice models rely on stochastic assumptions and specifications to 
account for unobserved factors related to a) choice alternatives, b) taste variation over 
people and over time, and c) heterogeneous choice sets (Baltas and Doyle, 2001). 
Assuming a distribution for the unobserved portion of farmers’ utility leads to a 
probabilistic model where for any given set of observed variables, a particular option may 
or may not be chosen depending on the realization of the random component (Lubowski, 
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2003). Assuming the unobserved (random) heterogeneity in decision making is additive 
and distributed as a type 1 extreme value, the multinomial logit model results (Train, 2003). 
 
In order to get a complete sense of the impact of different variables on enrollment in the 
top 25 conservation practices we looked at two discrete choice models with two degrees of 
complexity. We estimated a multinomial logit with and without alternative specific 
constants. The model without alternative specific constants controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity in four groups defined by whether the practice went through general or 
continuous enrollment and whether it removes productive land from intensive use or not. 
The alternative specific conditional logit goes a step further by absorbing any time-
invariant, practice-specific heterogeneity in the constants. For example, some conservation 
practices may generate significant on-farm benefits and (perhaps as a result) offer relatively 
low payments. Failing to capture this practice-specific information in the alternative 
specific conditional logit could lead to biased estimation of the coefficient associated with 
CRP payments. In addition, some practices come bundled with additional financial benefits 
such as rental rate incentives and cost share payments. The model with alternative specific 
constants was necessary in order to understand the role that the payment received for 
different conservation practices had on enrollment in those practices. This model picks up 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics of particular practices that might be correlated 
with the observables. Therefore, it is a more robust model than the multinomial logit 
without alternative specific constants.  
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All models were estimated in Stata. The omitted base for the conditional logit is continuous 
enrollment and productive land practices. For the alternative specific conditional logit, the 
omitted base was CP 21, Filter Strips. This was chosen as the omitted base because it was 
the most chosen practice across all farms in the models.  
 
The random utility function for this analysis is as follows:  
 
No Farm Characteristics (Without and With Alternative Specific Constants) 
Model 1: 
Ufpt = θprod=1,cts=0 + θprod=0,cts=0 + θprod=0,cts=1 + α(prod,cts)*Pmtpt + 
β(prod,cts)*FutureAvgt + γ(prod,cts)*FutureCVt + ϵfpt 
 
Model 2: 
Ufpt = θp + α(prod,cts)*Pmtpt + β(prod,cts)*FutureAvgt + γ(prod,cts)*FutureCVt + ϵfpt 
 
Where: 
α(prod,cts) = α0 + α1prod + α2cts 
β(prod,cts) = β1prod + β2cts 
γ(prod,cts) = γ1prod + γ2cts 
 
Ufpt = Expected utility of farmer f for practice p at time t 
cts = 1 for continuous sign-up and = 0 otherwise 
prod = 1 if the practice takes land out of productivity and = 0 otherwise  
θprod=1,cts=0 = 1 if the practice takes land out of productivity and went through general  
sign-up and = 0 otherwise 
θprod=0,cts=0 = 1 if the practice does not take land out of productivity and went through 
general sign-up and = 0 otherwise 
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θprod=0,cts=1 = 1 if the practice does not take land out of productivity and went through 
continuous sign-up and = 0 otherwise 
θp = alternative (practice) specific constant relative to omitted category CP 21 (Filter Strips) 
Pmtpt = Conservation practice payment: Average per practice 
FutureAvgt = Corn Futures: Year-long average 
FutureCVt = Corn Futures: Year-long coefficient of variation 
 
Where subscript f = farm-varying, p = alternative-varying (practice), and t = time-varying  
 
Farm Characteristics (Without and With Alternative Specific Constants) 
Model 3: 
Ufpt = θprod=1,cts=0 + θprod=0,cts=0 + θprod=0,cts=1 + 
α(prod,cts,csravg,csrgood,HEL,NHEL)*Pmtpt + β(prod,cts)*FutureAvgt + 
γ(prod,cts)*FutureCVt + μ1(prod,cts)*CSRAvgf + μ2(prod,cts)*CSRGoodf + 
ρ1(prod,cts)*HELf + ρ2(prod,cts)*NHELf + η1(prod,cts)*Cornf + η2(prod,cts)*Waterf + 
η3(prod,cts)*Devf + η4(prod,cts)*Grassf + η5(prod,cts)*Wetlandf + η6(prod,cts)*Forestf + 
η7(prod,cts)*Miscf +  ϵfpt 
 
Model 4: 
Ufpt = θp + α(prod,cts,csravg,csrgood,HEL,NHEL)*Pmtpt + β(prod,cts)*FutureAvgt + 
γ(prod,cts)*FutureCVt + μ1(prod,cts)*CSRAvgf + μ2(prod,cts)*CSRGoodf + 
ρ1(prod,cts)*HELf + ρ2(prod,cts)*NHELf + η1(prod,cts)*Cornf + η2(prod,cts)*Waterf + 
η3(prod,cts)*Devf + η4(prod,cts)*Grassf + η5(prod,cts)*Wetlandf + η6(prod,cts)*Forestf + 
η7(prod,cts)*Miscf +  ϵfpt 
 
Where: 
α(prod,cts) = α0 + α1prod + α2cts 
β(prod,cts) = β1prod + β2cts 
γ(prod,cts) = γ1prod + γ2cts 
μ1(prod,cts) = μ11prod + μ12cts 
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μ2(prod,cts) = μ21prod + μ22cts 
ρ1(prod,cts) = ρ11prod + ρ12cts 
ρ2(prod,cts) = ρ21prod + ρ22cts 
η1(prod,cts) = η11prod + η12cts 
η2(prod,cts) = η21prod + η22cts 
η3(prod,cts) = η31prod + η32cts 
η4(prod,cts) = η41prod + η42cts 
η5(prod,cts) = η51prod + η52cts 
η6(prod,cts) = η61prod + η62cts 
η7(prod,cts) = η71prod + η72cts 
 
Ufpt = Expected utility of farmer f for practice p at time t 
cts = 1 for continuous sign-up and = 0 otherwise 
prod = 1 if the practice takes land out of productivity and = 0 otherwise  
csravg = 1 if CSR is average and = 0 otherwise 
csrgood = 1 if CSR is average and = 0 otherwise 
HEL = 1 if erosion is highly erodible and = 0 otherwise 
NHEL = 1 if erosion is non-highly erodible and = 0 otherwise 
θprod=1,cts=0 = 1 if the practice takes land out of productivity and went through general sign-
up and = 0 otherwise 
θprod=0,cts=0 = 1 if the practice does not take land out of productivity and went through 
general sign-up and = 0 otherwise 
θprod=0,cts=1 = 1 if the practice does not take land out of productivity and went through 
continuous sign-up and = 0 otherwise 
θp = alternative (practice) specific constant relative to omitted category CP 21 (Filter Strips) 
Pmtpt = Conservation practice payment: Average per practice 
FutureAvgt = Corn Futures: Year-long average 
FutureCVt = Corn Futures: Year-long coefficient of variation 
CSRAvgf = 1 if Corn Suitability Rating is average and = 0 otherwise 
CSRGoodf = 1 if Corn Suitability Rating is good and = 0 otherwise 
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HELf = 1 if erosion is highly erodible land and = 0 otherwise 
NHELf = 1 if erosion is non-highly erodible land and = 0 otherwise 
Cornf  = 1 if land cover is corn and = 0 otherwise 
Waterf  = 1 if land cover is water and = 0 otherwise 
Devf  = 1 if land cover is developed and = 0 otherwise 
Grassf = 1 if land cover is grassland and = 0 otherwise 
Wetlandf = 1 if land cover is wetland and = 0 otherwise 
Forestf = 1 if land cover is forest and = 0 otherwise 
Miscf = 1 if land cover is miscellaneous and = 0 otherwise 
 
Where subscript f = farm-varying, p = alternative-varying (practice), and t = time-varying  
 
There are five key hypotheses for this chapter: 
 
1. Farmers with high opportunity cost land (in terms of corn and soy productivity) 
are less likely to enroll in practices that retire productive land than farmers with less 
valuable land for farming. 
 
This hypothesis assumes that payment is held constant. There are three different methods 
to test this hypothesis by looking at corn suitability rating, erodibility, and land cover. 
 
First, we looked at the interaction of all practices that take productive land out of use with 
the different levels of corn suitability, prod*CSRAvgf and prod*CSRGoodf. We expected 
the signs for both prod*CSRAvgf and prod*CSRGoodf to be negative relative to the omitted 
base of CSRBadf. The interaction prod*CSRGoodf is likely more negative than 
prod*CSRAvgf.  
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Second, we examined the interaction of all practices that remove productive land from use 
with the seven different land cover types, prod*Cornf, prod*Waterf, prod*Devf, 
prod*Grassf, prod*Wetlandf, prod*Forestf, and prod*Miscf. For prod*Cornf we would 
expect the sign to be negative since it is associated with high productivity land and would 
reduce enrollment, although since it is in comparison to prod*Soyf it is difficult to say since 
farms often utilize a corn-soy rotation on the same land. For prod*Waterf, prod*Devf, 
prod*Grassf, prod*Wetlandf, prod*Forestf, and prod*Miscf we would expect the sign to be 
positive relative to the omitted base of unprod*Soyf. 
 
Third, we analyzed the interaction of all practices that take productive land out of use with 
the different levels of erodibility, prod*HELf and prod*NHELf. For prod*HELf we would 
expect the sign to be positive and for prod*NHELf we would expect the sign to be negative 
relative to the omitted base of unprod*UHELf. As stated above, UHELf is mostly land that 
is not under cultivation, while NHELf has a larger percentage of land that is under 
cultivation than HELf. 
 
2a. Farmers are less likely to enroll in practices that retire productive land, the higher 
the expected future price of corn and soy (as measured by average corn and soy 
futures). 
 
This hypothesis can be addressed in two different ways, by looking at practices that take 
productive land out of use and practices that go through continuous sign-up. 
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First, we looked at the interaction of practices that take productive land out of use and 
average corn futures, prod*FutureAvgt. For prod*FutureAvgt we would expect the sign to 
be negative relative to the omitted base of unprod*FutureAvgt. Looking at the interaction 
of practices that take productive land out of use and average corn futures we expect that 
practices that take productive land out of use would be greatly impacted by what farmers 
expect the market to do. 
 
Second, we looked at the interaction of practices that go through continuous sign-up and 
average corn futures, cts*FutureAvgt. For cts*FutureAvgt we would expect the sign to be 
negative relative to the omitted base of gen* FutureAvgt. We expect this result because 
continuous practices can be enrolled at any time and as such are more likely to mimic the 
market. 
 
2b. Farmers are more likely to enroll in practices that retire productive land, the 
higher the expected coefficient of variation for price of corn and soy (as measured by 
corn and soy futures). 
 
This hypothesis is addressed by looking at practices that take productive land out of use, 
specifically the interaction of practices that take productive land out of use and corn 
futures coefficient of variation, prod*FutureCVt.  For prod*FutureCVt we would expect 
the sign to be positive relative to the omitted base of unprod*FutureCVt. Higher CV 
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should provide a reason for risk-averse farmers to enroll in CRP on productive land since 
it is a guaranteed payment.  
 
3. The price elasticity of supply is higher as the quality of land increases (as measured 
by CSR and erodibility). 
 
There are two different methods to test this hypothesis by looking at corn suitability 
rating and erodibility. 
 
The first method can be measured through the interaction of payment with different levels 
of corn suitability, csravg*Pmtpt and csrgood*Pmtpt. For both csravg*Pmtpt and 
csrgood*Pmtpt we would expect the signs of the coefficient to be positive relative to the 
omitted base of csrbad*Pmtpt. 
 
We believe that a high corn suitability rating means the land is more valuable for intensive 
agricultural production. Therefore, we would expect farmers to be more sensitive to the 
CRP payment for whether to retire high-quality land relative to less productive land. 
 
The second method can be measured through the interaction of payment with varying levels 
of erodibility, HELf*Pmtpt and NHELf*Pmtpt. For both HELf*Pmtpt and NHELf*Pmtpt we 
expect the sign to be positive relative to the omitted base of UHEL*Pmtpt. We expect the 
coefficient on HELf to be larger than NHELf, since we know that around 60% of NHELf is 
unproductive and 70% of HELf is unproductive.  
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Non-highly erodible land is a proxy for ability to keep land in production by planting corn 
and soy since the land it unlikely to erode. As the price varies, farmers will be less price 
sensitive to highly erodible land, and the elasticity of supply will lower.  
 
As stated above, UHELf is mostly land that is not under cultivation, while NHELf has a 
larger percentage of land that is under cultivation than HELf. But both NHELf and HELf 
have a large percentage of land under cultivation, 41% and 30% respectively. Therefore, it 
may be difficult to distinguish between the two. 
 
4. The price elasticity of supply is higher for practices that take land out of 
production, than for practices involving unproductive land. 
 
This hypothesis can be measured through the interaction of payment with conservation 
practices that take productive land out of use, prod*Pmtpt. We would expect the sign to be 
positive relative to the omitted base category unprod*Pmtpt. This means that farmers would 
be more price elastic to practices that take land out of production compared to those that 
do not. This is an interaction of payment and practice type, as opposed to hypothesis three 
which considers an interaction of payment and farm characteristics.  
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5. The price elasticity of supply is higher for practices with continuous sign-up. 
 
This hypothesis can be measured through the interaction of payment with conservation 
practices that go through continuous sign-up, cts*Pmtpt. We expect the price elasticity of 
supply to be higher for practices in continuous sign-up compared to general sign-up.  
 
This is an interaction of payment and practice type similar to hypothesis four, as opposed 
to hypothesis three which is an interaction of payment and farm characteristics. As the 
payments vary, farmers will be more price sensitive to land in continuous sign-up, and 
elasticity of supply will higher. As such, we expect the sign to be positive. We would expect 
practices that go through continuous sign-up to have higher payment amounts since the 
payment determination mechanisms between general and continuous sign-up are so 
different. General sign-up involves a bidding process. By selecting farmers that are willing 
to enroll at lower payments, general sign-up practices will appear less price sensitive. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As mentioned above, four models of increasing complexity were utilized for this analysis. 
Table 20 shows the results of tests that demonstrate the relative performance of the models 
and the relative improvement and statistical support for the increasingly complex models.  
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The maximized log-likelihood values cannot be used alone as an index of fit because they 
are a function of sample size but can be used to compare the fit of different coefficients. 
As our models increase in complexity, the log-likelihood also increases, in this case getting 
closer to zero. 
 
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 measures goodness-of-fit. Values of .2 to .4 are considered highly 
satisfactory (McFadden, 1977). All of our models have pseudo-R2 values above .4. Both 
conditional logit models (Models 1 and 3) are slightly better than the pseudo-R2 for the 
alternative specific conditional logit models (Models 2 and 4). 
 
Lastly, Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
are used for model prediction. For both AIC and BIC lower amounts signify that the models 
are a better fit. As our models increase in complexity (from Model 1 to 4), both AIC and 
BIC decrease, signifying that the more complex model is a better fit than the previous 
model. 
 
Table 20. Model Performance 
Model # Log-Likelihood pseudo-R2 AIC BIC 
1 -35,498.97 0.5084 71017.93     71130.3 
2 -28,987.17 0.4616 58036.34    58384.69 
3 -26,738.94 0.5890 53549.88 53950.66 
4 -23,152.01 0.5700 46418.02     47052.6 
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Tables 21 and 22 demonstrate the results of the four models. The first two models exclude 
farm characteristics while the second two models include farm characteristics. Both tables 
include the conditional and alternative specific conditional logit results. 
 
Table 21.  No Farm Characteristics, Conditional Logit and Alternative Specific 
Conditional Logit 
Model 1. Conditional Logit Model 2. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit  
Coef. 
 
Coef. 
Continuous 
Xunproductiveland 
-2.915**** 
(.053) 
 
General 
Xproductiveland 
2.389**** 
(.038) 
General 
Xunproductiveland 
3.018**** 
(.036) 
paymentreal (base) 3.361**** 
(.037) 
paymentreal (base) 4.760**** 
(.063) 
Xproductiveland -0.955**** 
(.033) 
Xproductiveland -2.438**** 
(.067) 
Xcontinuous -0.384**** 
(.040) 
Xcontinuous 0.976**** 
(.064) 
Futures: yearlong average  (interactions) 
Xproductiveland -0.141**** 
(.028) 
Xproductiveland -0.168**** 
(.035) 
Xcontinuous -0.052* 
(.028) 
Xcontinuous -0.087*** 
(.033) 
Futures: coefficient of variation (interactions) 
Xproductiveland -0.097**** 
(.025) 
Xproductiveland -0.149**** 
(.030) 
Xcontinuous 0.096**** 
(.025) 
Xcontinuous 0.100**** 
(.029) 
z statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
 
Table 22.  Farm Characteristics, Conditional Logit and Alternative Specific 
Conditional Logit 
Model 3. Conditional Logit Model 4. Alternative Specific 
Conditional Logit  
Coef. 
 
Coef. 
Continuous 
Xunproductiveland 
-1.489**** 
(.114) 
 
General 
Xproductiveland 
-2.489**** 
(.167) 
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General 
Xunproductiveland 
-1.026**** 
(.167) 
paymentreal (base) 1.727**** 
(.061) 
paymentreal (base) 3.560**** 
(.079) 
Xproductiveland  -0.394**** 
(.036) 
Xproductiveland -2.015**** 
(.071) 
Xcontinuous  -1.086**** 
(.048) 
Xcontinuous 0.051 
(.070) 
Xcsraverage 1.299**** 
(.056) 
Xcsraverage 0.831**** 
(.051) 
Xcsrgood 2.530**** 
(.060) 
Xcsrgood 1.629**** 
(.058) 
Xhighlyero 
 
2.571**** 
(.048) 
Xhighlyero 
 
1.989**** 
(.049) 
Xnonhighlyero 
 
3.060**** 
(.051) 
Xnonhighlyero 
 
2.274**** 
(.049) 
Futures: yearlong average  (interactions) 
Xproductiveland -0.081*** 
(.031) 
Xproductiveland -0.126**** 
(.036) 
Xcontinuous -0.220**** 
(.037) 
Xcontinuous -0.132**** 
(.041) 
Futures: coefficient of variation (interactions) 
Xproductiveland -0.070*** 
(.028) 
Xproductiveland -0.130**** 
(.032) 
Xcontinuous 0.055* 
(.033) 
Xcontinuous 0.118**** 
(.037) 
Corn Suitability Rating: Class 2, Average 
Xproductiveland -0.260**** 
(.066) 
Xproductiveland -0.161** 
(.068) 
Xcontinuous -1.146**** 
(.098) 
Xcontinuous -0.542**** 
(.092) 
Corn Suitability Rating: Class 3, Good 
Xproductiveland -0.247**** 
(.076) 
Xproductiveland -0.144*** 
(.079) 
Xcontinuous -1.426**** 
(.112) 
Xcontinuous -0.177* 
(.109) 
Erodibility: Highly Erodible Land 
Xproductiveland 0.169* 
(.095) 
Xproductiveland -0.171* 
(.104) 
Xcontinuous -4.287**** 
(.117) 
Xcontinuous -3.268**** 
(.116) 
Erodibility: Not Highly Erodible Land 
Xproductiveland -0.098 
(.098) 
Xproductiveland -0.389**** 
(.108) 
Xcontinuous -3.012**** 
(.126) 
Xcontinuous -1.709**** 
(.129) 
Land Cover: Corn 
Xproductiveland 0.086 
(.110) 
Xproductiveland 0.137 
(.118) 
Xcontinuous 0.242* 
(.150) 
Xcontinuous 0.186 
(.158) 
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Land Cover: Water 
Xproductiveland -0.481 
(.594) 
Xproductiveland -0.566 
(.659) 
Xcontinuous 2.342*** 
(.911) 
Xcontinuous 2.420*** 
(.971) 
Land Cover: Developed 
Xproductiveland 0.772**** 
(.199) 
Xproductiveland 0.712*** 
(.220) 
Xcontinuous -0.842*** 
(.266) 
Xcontinuous -0.968**** 
(.285) 
Land Cover: Grassland 
Xproductiveland 0.969**** 
(.090) 
Xproductiveland 0.925**** 
(.096) 
Xcontinuous -2.045**** 
(.118) 
Xcontinuous -2.046**** 
(.125) 
Land Cover: Wetlands 
Xproductiveland 1.805**** 
(.252) 
Xproductiveland 1.563**** 
(.277) 
Xcontinuous -1.691**** 
(.313) 
Xcontinuous -1.411**** 
(.333) 
Land Cover: Forest 
Xproductiveland 1.048**** 
(.151) 
Xproductiveland 0.920**** 
(.159) 
Xcontinuous -2.034**** 
(.189) 
Xcontinuous -1.939**** 
(.197) 
Land Cover: Miscellaneous 
Xproductiveland 2.398**** 
(.213) 
Xproductiveland 2.544**** 
(.228) 
Xcontinuous -5.752**** 
(.337) 
Xcontinuous -5.835**** 
(.359) 
z statistics in parentheses * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01  **** p<0.001 
 
We now evaluate our hypotheses. Note that all hypotheses involving farm characteristics 
can only be tested using Models 3 and 4.  
 
1. Farmers with high opportunity cost land (in terms of corn and soy productivity) 
are less likely to enroll in practices that retire productive land than farmers with less 
valuable land for farming. 
 
The interactions prod*CSRAvgf and prod*CSRGoodf were negative and significant for 
Models 3 and 4 as we hypothesized. These are compared to a base which is CSRBadf. CSR 
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is a measure of the relative quality of productive land. The hypothesis that farmers are less 
likely to commit productive land to CRP the higher the CSR of that land holds true. 
 
The interactions of prod*Devf, prod*Grassf, prod*Wetlandf, prod*Forestf, and prod*Miscf 
were positive and significant across Models 3 and 4 as we hypothesized. These land covers 
are in areas that do not take productive land out of use. The interaction of prod*Cornf was 
positive but insignificant and the interaction of prod*Waterf was negative but insignificant 
It is not unexpected that prod*Cornf was positive but insignificant because we utilized 
prod*Soyf as the base category. In practice, corn-soy act as a single cropping system, where 
farmers use a corn-soy rotation. 
 
We hypothesized that prod*HELf would be positive and prod*NHELf would be negative 
relative to the omitted base of unprod*UHELf. The interaction prod*HELf was positive and 
significant in Model 3 and negative and significant in Model 4. We did not anticipate a 
negative and significant interaction for prod*HELf as seen in Model 4. The interaction 
prod*NHELf was negative for Models 3 and 4, but only significant in Model 4, which is 
what we hypothesized. 
 
2a. Farmers are less likely to enroll in practices that retire productive land, the higher 
the expected future price of corn and soy (as measured by average corn and soy 
futures). 
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Since we know that farmers look at corn futures when making long-term decisions, such 
as signing a 10- to 15-year CRP contract, we hypothesized that farmers would be less likely 
to enroll in CRP, specifically practices that take their land out of production, if corn futures 
are increasing. This hypothesis is confirmed; the interaction prod*FutureAvgt was negative 
and significant across Models 1 through 4. We also find that the interaction cts*FutureAvgt 
was negative and significant across Models 1 through 4 as we hypothesized.  
 
2b. Farmers are more likely to enroll in practices that retire productive land, the 
higher the expected coefficient of variation for price of corn and soy (as measured by 
corn and soy futures). 
 
For prod*FutureCVt we expected the sign to be positive relative to the omitted base of 
unprod*FutureCVt. Higher CV should theoretically make risk-averse farmers (without 
perfect insurance and hedging opportunities) more likely to take the “sure thing” of the 
CRP contract on their productive lands. However, this hypothesis was rejected; the 
interaction prod*FutureCVt was negative and significant for Models 1 through 4.  
 
3. The price elasticity of supply is higher as the quality of land increases (as measured 
by CSR and erodibility). 
 
We expected that farmers with land with a higher CSR rating would need a higher payment 
to enroll in practices, due to the higher opportunity cost of enrollment in CRP. For both 
csravg*Pmtpt and csrgood*Pmtpt the coefficients were positive and significant for Models 
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3 and 4, as we hypothesized. This suggests that the price elasticity of supply is higher as 
the quality of land increases (as measured by CSR).  
 
When looking at erodibility, HELf*Pmtpt and NHELf*Pmtpt were expected to have positive 
signs, which they do. This is likely because the base, UHELf, is mostly land that is not in 
cultivation, while HELf and NHELf both have high percentages of land that are under 
cultivation.  
 
4. The price elasticity of supply is higher for practices that take land out of 
production, than for practices involving unproductive land. 
 
We believed farmers would be more price elastic when productive land is affected by the 
practice as compared to marginal land. Looking at the interaction prod*Pmtpt, our results 
demonstrate that the interaction is negative and significant for Models 1 through 4. We 
hypothesized that the interaction would be positive, and this hypothesis is therefore 
rejected. That means that the price elasticity of supply is lower for practices that take land 
out of production, than for practices involving unproductive land. 
 
5. The price elasticity of supply is higher for practices with continuous sign-up. 
 
Practices that are enrolled through continuous sign-up interacted with payments, cts*Pmtpt, 
are negative compared to the base gen*Pmtpt in Models 1 and 3 and positive in Models 2 
and 4. We expected the sign to be positive, meaning that the price elasticity of supply is 
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higher for practices with continuous sign-up. Therefore, the evidence is ambiguous with 
the alternative specific conditional logit models agreeing with the hypothesis, but only 
weakly (and insignificantly for Model 4). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Farmers’ voluntary decisions to enroll in particular CRP practices are shaped by a range of 
factors including market conditions, farm and landscape characteristics, and specific 
features of individual conservation contracts. Our main findings are that: 
 
• farmers are less likely to commit productive land to CRP as the quality of land 
increases (as measured by CSR); 
• farmers are less likely to enroll in CRP, specifically practices that take their land 
out of production, if corn futures are increasing; 
• the price elasticity of supply is higher as the quality of land increases (as measured 
by CSR); and 
• the price elasticity of supply is, surprisingly, lower for practices that take land out 
of production, than for practices involving unproductive land. 
 
These findings have several potentially valuable implications for thinking about CRP 
policy design. First, holding price constant, farmers are more likely to choose a practice 
that is implemented on unproductive land than one that takes productive land out of use. 
However, this tendency potentially dilutes the additionality (and cost-effectiveness) of 
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CRP, depending on the efficacy of the underlying changes in practices (if any) on the 
unproductive land. In order to incentivize farmers to substitute toward practices involving 
productive lands CRP managers may need to either increase the relative payment for these 
practices or find ways to increase their attractiveness through other non-price incentives, 
such as technical assistance.  
 
This is extremely important when thinking about the implications for improving water 
quality since marginal land is unlikely to be the main contributor to the water quality 
problems faced in Iowa. Enhancing enrollment of lands suited to intensive use in corn and 
soy production may enhance the additionality and physical effectiveness of CRP contracts, 
but at the cost of greater outlays to farmers. Whether this would yield more cost-effective 
provision of water quality and other ecosystem services likely depends upon the particulars 
of the program design. Our model provides a valuable simulation tool for considering how 
changes in program design – especially payment structure across practices – may affect 
farmers’ choices of CRP practices across the spectrum of farm quality.  
 
Second, the current use of the 3-year average county rental rate to determine prices for 
CRP practices in continuous sign-up fails to adequately match farmers’ adaptive 
responsiveness to changes in the price prospects of commodity crops. Given our findings 
that farmers react in economically rational ways to contemporaneous changes in futures 
markets in their CRP enrollment decisions, the use of lagged rental rates to set CRP 
payments tends to drastically overpay in periods of anticipated commodity price slides, 
with correspondingly drastic underpayment in periods of steep price increases. This may 
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induce a countercyclical ‘boom-bust’ variability in CRP enrollment in productive lands 
practices above and beyond what would already occur if CRP payments adjusted to 
commodity prices in a less sluggish manner. Whether greater smoothing of CRP enrollment 
patterns is desired as a policy objective depends in part on the extent to which USDA 
desires to use CRP practices on productive lands as a form of insurance for risk-averse 
farmers as opposed to a means to secure a stable flow of reliable ecosystems services across 
the landscape.   
 
Third, on a related point, managers may consider shortening the 10- to 15-year contract 
length for continuous sign-up practices taking productive land out of production or perhaps 
consider offering variable length contracts for the same CRP practice. This would give 
farmers the flexibility to make shorter-term decisions while potentially allowing CRP to 
increase the cost-effectiveness of its contracts. Most practices in continuous sign-up can 
see improved water quality benefits in a shorter period of time than the current contract 
lengths. This would also improve targeting of different ecosystem services. 
 
Future Research 
 
It is important to note the limitations to this analysis. Characteristics specific to the farmer, 
such as total household income, tenancy structure (i.e. owner operated vs. leased), date 
until retirement, and many other potentially relevant variables are not readily available and 
are thus unobserved in our analysis. This unobserved farmer heterogeneity could be 
correlated with land characteristics and therefore our estimates should not be taken causally 
 104 
and predictions from our model should be viewed with caution. Given the absence of 
important farm and (especially) farmer-level data, model predictions could be improved by 
developing a random parameters logit specification. This model would incorporate 
heterogeneity in the responses of farmers as a function of observable farm-level 
characteristics – potentially yielding more robust predictions of farmers’ substitution 
patterns.  
 
Our main contribution is in analyzing heterogeneous practices in order to better target 
outcomes for physical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. This is the first paper that has 
disaggregated conservation practices in order to improve the understanding of the 
determinants of the opportunity cost of the CRP. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation addresses three key questions about the water quality goals of the CRP 
program in Iowa: 
 
1. What are the effects of crops, natural cover, and CRP conservation practices on 
lake water quality; 
2. How does cost-effectiveness differ between CRP practices that target water quality, 
either alone or in combination with other environmental objectives; and 
3. Assuming farmers enroll in CRP, what types of practices are they choosing and 
what factors do those practices possess? 
 
These questions target the physical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and characteristics of 
CRP practices aimed at lake water quality in Iowa. The study is motivated by the recent 
sharp increase in Iowa’s contribution to nitrogen pollution of the Mississippi and Missouri 
rivers, and hence to the ‘dead zone’ in the Gulf of Mexico. Iowa is currently responsible 
for more than half of the nitrogen load in the Missouri. This represents an increase in 
emissions of around 50 percent since 2003, 90 percent of which is due to crop cultivation 
in the state (Jones et al., 2018). This is despite the efforts of the Conservation Reserve 
Program to encourage farmers to reduce the flow of agricultural nutrients to waterways.   
 
The results on the physical effectiveness of CRP reported in Chapter Two show that while 
CRP conservation practices aimed at water quality had little impact on phosphorus, 
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chlorophyll a, or turbidity in the study period, they did have a large impact on the nutrient 
of greatest concern, nitrogen. Given the potential impact of the program on nitrogen, we 
then considered which CRP practices were cost-effective in reducing nitrogen in Chapter 
Three, and what factors affected the amount of land enrolled in CRP in the lake watersheds 
in Chapter Four.  
 
In Chapter Three we explored the cost-effectiveness of the different CRP practices 
targeting water quality. We expected practices offered through the general sign-up to be 
amongst the most cost-effective since they go through a reverse auction designed to be 
cost-effective. However, while thirty percent of conservation practices were found to have 
a statistically significant positive effect on at least one water quality variable in Iowa’s 
lakes, many were cost-ineffective relative to practices that go through continuous sign-up. 
Because they had only a weak effect on water quality, the cost per unit improvement in 
water quality was high. Moreover, many of the least cost-effective conservation practices 
were found to be offered through general sign-up.  
 
Understanding what leads to enrollment in specific conservation practices will allow the 
USDA to improve targeting for ecosystem service provision, in this case for water quality. 
In Chapter Four we found that farmers’ voluntary decisions to enroll in particular CRP 
practices were shaped by a range of conditions, including particular farm characteristics, 
specific features of individual conservation contracts, crop prices, and the price of 
conservation contracts. Specifically, we found that farmers were less likely to commit 
productive land to CRP as the quality of land increased; that they were less likely to enroll 
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in CRP practices that took land out of production if corn futures were increasing; and that 
the price elasticity of supply (enrollment) was higher as the quality of land increased. 
Interestingly, we also found that the price elasticity of supply was lower for practices that 
took land out of production than for practices involving unproductive land. 
 
Implications for science and policy 
 
The implications of our individual findings are reported in each chapter. Here we offer a 
brief summary and discuss the broader implications of our findings for the management of 
nitrogen pollution of waterways. In the CRP Handbook, the CRP’s stated objective is to 
encourage owners and operators to conserve and improve land resources in a cost-effective 
manner (United States Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2015). Our results 
show that a number of CRP practices targeting lake water quality have a limited impact, 
and that the incentives for farmers to enroll in cost-effective practices that do improve 
water quality are weak. The following are suggestions for policy improvement: 
 
1. Aim for a better balance between the price of practices offered through continuous 
sign-up and the opportunity cost of land taken out of production—the marginal net 
revenue of crop production. This may be through shortening contract lengths, or 
through adjustable contract prices. Chapter Four demonstrated that farmers were more 
likely to choose a practice implemented on unproductive land than on productive land. 
This is partly because the prices of conservation practices that take land out of 
production are frequently below the opportunity cost of the land. Matching the price of 
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practices that provide improvements in water quality and take productive land out of 
use would increase the incentive for farmers to enroll in them. 
2. Adjust the 3-year average county rental rate used to determine prices for CRP practices 
in continuous sign-up. The current use of lagged rental rates to set CRP payments tends 
to drastically overpay in periods of anticipated commodity price slides, with 
correspondingly drastic underpayment in periods of steep price increases. Adjusting to 
a 1-year average county rental rate could greatly improve farmers willingness to choose 
practices that take productive land out of use. 
3. Promote practices that are shown to be cost-effective. The FSA as an institution spends 
a good deal of its efforts going out into the field to promote enrollment in specific 
practices. Based on our results, FSA could deploy its team to work with farmer 
cooperatives and individual farmers to boost enrollment in cost-effective practices. 
4. Undertake measures to improve the cost-effectiveness of cost-ineffective practices. 
One way to do this might be to allow practices to move between continuous and general 
sign-up. Practices that are targeted at water quality and are currently cost-ineffective 
are good candidates to move from continuous sign-up to general sign-up. This would 
result in lowering the cost of delivering ecosystem service provisions. 
5. Adjust the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) used for general sign-up to focus on 
physical impacts that meet the water quality objectives of the USDA. One option would 
be to create a subset of characteristics specifically focused on water quality that address 
in more detail the outcomes that the CRP program is looking to achieve (more of a 
focus on conditionality). 
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6. Since many conservation practices are only applicable in limited biophysical 
conditions, identify the cost-effectiveness of the sub-set of practices that meet those 
conditions. For example, the Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer practice is 
only applicable where there is pasture and not cropland, it is not an option in many 
situations. In this case, the ranking of practices by target, biophysical conditions, and 
cost-effectiveness would provide useful information. 
 
As with PES schemes in general, the main concerns with CRP are whether it offers 
additionality, whether it is offers the hoped-for impacts on the supply of ecosystem 
services, and whether it is cost-effective. While we were unable to directly test for 
additionality, we were able to test the physical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 
particular practices, and the factors affecting the supply of land in conservation. We were 
able to do this because of the availability of detailed data on enrollment, payments, 
contracts, and, most importantly, on water quality. While the monitoring of water quality 
is not undertaken as part of the CRP, it is critical to the assessment of both physical 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Few PES schemes elsewhere benefit from monitoring 
data in the same way. Nevertheless, evaluation of CRP performance would be simpler if 
additional data were generated on the value of land for farms that are not enrolled in the 
CRP, detailed ownership information (owner, operator, and owner-operator), and socio-
economic data at the farm level (as opposed to the randomized surveys conducted by 
USDA NASS). 
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Steps for Future Research 
 
As with any research, there are opportunities to improve on the work that has been done. 
For Chapter Two we could compare our results to a Soil and Water Assessment Toil 
(SWAT) analysis. This would provide an opportunity to validate our results using 
hydrological data. 
 
For Chapter Three future research should look at non-marginal changes related to cost-
effectiveness of conservation practices. There is also a need to look at the heterogeneity 
and spatial specificity of particular conservation practices on the landscape. In addition, 
there needs to be further research into why many of the practices that are targeted at 
improving water quality were not physically effective or cost-effective. 
 
For Chapter Four future research should look at other models that allow for heterogeneity 
of behavioral responses by farmers with a given set of farm characteristics. In addition, the 
role of social capital should be looked into since we know that many farmers make 
decisions about what conservation practices to enroll in based on what their neighbors are 
doing. 
 
Lastly, tests for additionality of conservation practices is greatly needed. It is necessary to 
understand whether conservation practices induce farmers to undertake conservation 
measures that they would not otherwise do. 
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Implications for a wider understanding of PES schemes 
 
CRP is one of the oldest examples of a PES scheme, albeit one that is better served by data 
than almost any other example. We would expect that the factors influencing additionality 
and cost-effectiveness in CRP likely apply to other PES schemes. By having a clearer 
understanding of what works in CRP and why, we may be in a better position to understand 
what might work and why in other schemes. 
 
As with many other PES schemes, CRP attempts to incentivize farmers to produce public 
goods on private land. It does so by providing landholders with an incentive to change land 
use. Additionally, monitoring within the program focuses on whether the payment led to 
the change in practice, not whether the change in practice had the desired impact on water 
quality. This is often due to a lack of baseline data, funds for monitoring, and a long enough 
time series to see an impact. In practice, very few PES schemes base payments on the value 
of increments to ecosystem services. Our research was able to quantify the impact of CRP 
on a change in an ecosystem service, water quality, because water quality data were 
available from other sources. Since conditionality is a key aspect of a successful PES 
scheme, continued evaluation of changes in ecosystem services, as opposed to adherence 
to contracts, is necessary (Goldman-Benner et al., 2012). The main implication of our work 
for other PES schemes is that evaluation of physical effectiveness or cost-effectiveness 
depends on the generation of data on the impact of practices on the environmental variable 
of interest.  
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A further implication is that enrollment depends on the existence of payments that track 
the opportunity cost of changes in land use. This affects both the mean level of payments 
(they need to be at least as great as the opportunity cost) and their time profile (they need 
to change as the opportunity cost of land changes). Long contracts supported by inflexible 
payments may induce landholders to abandon contracts in mid-term. 
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APPENDIX A 
CHAPTER TWO WATER QUALITY FULL RESULTS 
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Phosphorus 
 RE RE + Lag FE FE + Lag FD FD + lag AB 
  lntotalP lntotalP lntotalP lntotalP D.lntotalP lntotalP lntotalP 
WATERSHARE -0.208 -0.114 0.033 -1.831   -0.257 
 (-0.30) (-0.23) -0.02 (-0.76)   (-0.08) 
DEVELOPEDSHARE -1.2 -0.665 1.956 2.577   6.375 
 (-0.78) (-0.83) -1.04 -0.98   -1.54 
WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE -0.103 0.945 -0.113 -0.221   0.767 
 (-0.09) -0.82 (-0.08) (-0.10)   -0.31 
FORESTTREESSHARE -1.861**** -0.528* -2.938 -5.502**   -2.229 
 (-4.36) (-1.72) (-1.57) (-2.37)   (-0.85) 
CORNSHARE 0.176 0.149 0.157 -0.0758   0.415 
 -0.41 -0.31 -0.35 (-0.16)   -0.76 
GRASSPASTURESHARE -0.309 0.123 0.547 1.039   1.931 
 (-0.73) -0.35 -0.69 -0.7   -1.21 
OTHERCROPSSHARE 0.509 0.284 2.136* 2.375   3.294* 
 -1.12 -0.95 -1.82 -1.32   -1.77 
L.lntotalP  0.625****  -0.0527  0.959**** 0.0574 
  -11.53  (-1.07)  -69.74 -0.43 
D.WATERSHARE     0.536 1.804  
     -0.23 -0.75  
D.DEVELOPEDSHARE     -0.949 -0.425  
     (-0.41) (-0.17)  
D.WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE     0.307 0.247  
     -0.19 -0.15  
D.FORESTTREESSHARE     -3.469* -2.507  
     (-1.82) (-1.25)  
D.CORNSHARE     0.366 0.345  
     -0.9 -0.88  
D.GRASSPASTURESHARE     0.351 0.262  
     -0.4 -0.3  
D.OTHERCROPSSHARE     1.926 1.695  
     -1.53 -1.34  
PerCRPofCrops 0.109 -0.314 0.603 0.639   2.283* 
 -0.17 (-0.82) -0.86 -0.62   -1.76 
D.PerCRPofCrops     1.136 1.361  
     -1.31 -1.52  
PerCornCRP -0.0000982 -0.0000836 -0.0000303 0.000136   0.000352 
 (-0.75) (-0.68) (-0.25) -0.57   -1.46 
PerGrassPastureCRP -0.0000473 -0.00000469 0.00000514 -0.00000538   0.000237* 
 (-0.93) (-0.13) -0.07 (-0.05)   -1.69 
PerForestTreesCRP 0.000794* -0.0000054 0.00083 0.00138   0.00164 
 -1.71 (-0.02) -0.95 -1.51   -1.16 
PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP -0.0000849 -0.0000796 0.00000458 -0.000137   0.00025 
 (-0.77) (-0.73) -0.04 (-0.67)   -1.15 
PerWaterCRP -0.00127 -0.00106 -0.000975 -0.00138   -0.00109 
 (-1.29) (-1.20) (-0.93) (-1.43)   (-1.32) 
PerDevelopedCRP 0.000624 0.000142 0.000276 0.00346   -0.0000796 
 -0.56 -0.23 -0.15 -1.2   (-0.03) 
PerOtherCropsCRP -0.000193 0.0000521 -0.000244 -0.000165   0.000087 
 (-1.53) -0.47 (-1.60) (-0.96)   -0.41 
D.PerCornCRP     -0.00000906 0.00000506  
     (-0.04) -0.02  
D.PerGrassPastureCRP     -0.0000224 -0.0000145  
     (-0.17) (-0.10)  
D.PerForestTreesCRP     0.000283 0.00065  
     -0.24 -0.58  
D.PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP     -0.0000659 -0.0000661  
     (-0.35) (-0.34)  
D.PerWaterCRP     -0.00145* -0.00163*  
     (-1.77) (-1.90)  
D.PerDevelopedCRP     -0.000652 -0.000568  
     (-0.26) (-0.23)  
D.PerOtherCropsCRP     -0.00029 -0.000278  
     (-1.62) (-1.51)  
Fall_Precip 0.0174** 0.0208** 0.0145 0.0155   0.00491 
 -2.13 -2.01 -1.64 -1.33   -0.41 
Winter_Precip -0.0253** -0.0228* -0.0261** -0.0263**   -0.0308** 
 (-2.41) (-1.73) (-2.47) (-2.32)   (-2.55) 
Spring_Precip 0.0149*** 0.00566 0.0131*** 0.0106**   0.00857 
 -3.01 -0.83 -2.63 -2.1   -1.38 
Summer_Precip 0.000101 -0.00914** -0.000467 -0.0042   -0.0058 
 -0.03 (-2.00) (-0.14) (-1.01)   (-1.22) 
D.Fall_Precip     0.014 0.0154*  
     -1.55 -1.69  
D.Winter_Precip     -0.0249** -0.0231**  
     (-2.23) (-2.01)  
D.Spring_Precip     0.00927* 0.00934**  
     -1.96 -1.97  
D.Summer_Precip     -0.000592 -0.000244  
     (-0.19) (-0.08)  
CAFO 0.0332 0.0044 0.173 0.142   0.344** 
 -0.33 -0.09 -1.39 -1.12   -2.54 
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D.CAFO     0.341** 0.307*  
     -2.12 -1.76  
Alfisols 0 0 0 0    
 (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Entisols -0.687*** -0.243** 0 0    
 (-3.28) (-2.17) (.) (.)    
Inceptisols -0.756*** -0.350**** 0 0    
 (-3.17) (-3.98) (.) (.)    
Mollisols -0.202 -0.0361 0 0    
 (-1.58) (-0.68) (.) (.)    
NoData -0.202 -0.0521 0 0    
 (-0.74) (-0.59) (.) (.)    
D.Dominant Soil Type     0   
     (.)   
Dominant Soil Type      0.0480*** 0.917*** 
      -2.95 -2.65 
Iowa LL Lake Depth -0.0583**** -0.0252**** -0.0154 0.00153   -0.00612 
 (-4.35) (-3.45) (-0.50) -0.04   (-0.13) 
D.Iowa LL Lake Depth     -0.00013 0.000642  
     (-0.01) -0.03  
Constant 5.178**** 1.940**** 4.290**** 4.853****   0 
 -14.6 -5.05 -7.07 -5.22   (.) 
Observations 570 467 570 467 458 458 358 
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Nitrogen 
 RE RE + Lag FE FE + Lag FD FD + lag AB 
  lntotalN lntotalN lntotalN lntotalN D.lntotalN lntotalN lntotalN 
WATERSHARE 0.287 -0.806 -7.695 -0.665   -1.134 
 -0.31 (-0.80) (-1.32) (-0.08)   (-0.10) 
DEVELOPEDSHARE -2.045 -1.566 -7.771** -4.491   1.798 
 (-1.63) (-1.30) (-2.27) (-0.67)   -0.18 
WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE -2.347 -2.632 -7.395** -4.268   -0.842 
 (-1.20) (-1.19) (-2.24) (-0.84)   (-0.13) 
FORESTTREESSHARE -0.801 -1.19 -2.828 -0.342   6.537 
 (-1.09) (-1.41) (-0.66) (-0.05)   -0.8 
CORNSHARE -0.0256 -0.73 0.405 0.418   0.91 
 (-0.03) (-0.70) -0.41 -0.4   -0.8 
GRASSPASTURESHARE 0.418 0.261 -3.568* -3.34   -3.787 
 -0.5 -0.25 (-1.71) (-1.02)   (-1.00) 
OTHERCROPSSHARE 0.688 0.453 -2.384 -2.771   -1.546 
 -1.04 -0.62 (-0.82) (-0.70)   (-0.33) 
L.lntotalN  0.149**  -0.185****  0.719**** -0.165* 
  -2.43  (-3.48)  -22.73 (-1.80) 
D.WATERSHARE     -7.342 3.719  
     (-0.88) -0.47  
D.DEVELOPEDSHARE     8 19.33***  
     -1.53 -2.82  
D.WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE     -0.0969 1.275  
     (-0.02) -0.35  
D.FORESTTREESSHARE     10.56** 18.00****  
     -2.05 -3.91  
D.CORNSHARE     0.515 0.234  
     -0.6 -0.31  
D.GRASSPASTURESHARE     -1.358 -0.582  
     (-0.66) (-0.31)  
D.OTHERCROPSSHARE     1.036 1.644  
     -0.33 -0.57  
PerCRPofCrops -1.990* -0.983 -5.152** -4.278   -2.664 
 (-1.94) (-1.04) (-2.45) (-1.22)   (-0.38) 
D.PerCRPofCrops     -2.702 1.748  
     (-0.84) -0.69  
PerCornCRP 0.000239 0.000207 -0.000254 -0.000756   -0.00175*** 
 -1.04 -0.92 (-0.77) (-1.42)   (-2.60) 
PerGrassPastureCRP -0.0000909 -0.000106 -0.000781**** -0.000750**   -0.00123*** 
 (-1.33) (-1.30) (-3.81) (-2.37)   (-2.87) 
PerForestTreesCRP 0.00121* 0.00143** 0.00201 0.000894   0.00112 
 -1.9 -2.19 -1.41 -0.44   -0.48 
PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP -0.000251 -0.0000161 -0.000776*** -0.000731*   -0.00136** 
 (-1.30) (-0.07) (-3.05) (-1.81)   (-2.12) 
PerWaterCRP -0.00125 -0.00106 -0.00136 -0.000223   -0.00107 
 (-0.84) (-0.81) (-1.01) (-0.15)   (-0.64) 
PerDevelopedCRP 0.0000747 0.000262 0.00284 0.00393   0.0115* 
 -0.07 -0.2 -1.16 -0.92   -1.85 
PerOtherCropsCRP -0.0000296 -0.0000136 -0.00116** -0.00123*   -0.00225*** 
 (-0.10) (-0.04) (-2.40) (-1.88)   (-3.24) 
D.PerCornCRP     -0.0005 -0.0000773  
     (-1.19) (-0.21)  
D.PerGrassPastureCRP     -0.000618* -0.000123  
     (-1.89) (-0.39)  
D.PerForestTreesCRP     0.00254 0.00511**  
     -1.12 -2.54  
D.PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP     -0.000554 -0.000232  
     (-1.20) (-0.55)  
D.PerWaterCRP     -0.000555 -0.00145  
     (-0.29) (-0.73)  
D.PerDevelopedCRP     0.00204 0.00313  
     -0.5 -0.88  
D.PerOtherCropsCRP     -0.00144*** -0.000874**  
     (-3.24) (-2.14)  
Fall_Precip -0.0821**** -0.0817**** -0.0806**** -0.139****   -0.145**** 
 (-5.13) (-4.20) (-4.15) (-5.11)   (-5.07) 
Winter_Precip -0.0486** -0.0334 -0.0481** -0.0293   -0.0137 
 (-2.23) (-1.32) (-2.12) (-1.17)   (-0.52) 
Spring_Precip 0.0363**** 0.0568**** 0.0353*** 0.0280**   0.0342** 
 -3.77 -4.48 -3.07 -2.16   -2.39 
Summer_Precip 0.0469**** 0.0454**** 0.0434**** 0.0546****   0.0597**** 
 -8.33 -5.77 -6.44 -6.84   -6.88 
D.Fall_Precip     -0.0655*** -0.0478**  
     (-3.12) (-2.55)  
D.Winter_Precip     -0.0582** -0.0263  
     (-2.04) (-0.94)  
D.Spring_Precip     0.0591**** 0.0477****  
     -5.05 -4.2  
D.Summer_Precip     0.0409**** 0.0316****  
     -5.81 -5.09  
CAFO -0.0224 -0.0539 0.543** 0.652**   0.693 
 (-0.22) (-0.52) -2.5 -2.29   -1.54 
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D.CAFO     0.915** 0.687*  
     -2.06 -1.78  
Alfisols 0 0 0 0    
 (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Entisols -0.133 -0.000983 0 0    
 (-0.53) (-0.00) (.) (.)    
Inceptisols -0.16 -0.19 0 0    
 (-0.64) (-0.76) (.) (.)    
Mollisols 0.0135 -0.0175 0 0    
 -0.08 (-0.10) (.) (.)    
NoData 0.201 0.337 0 0    
 -0.69 -1 (.) (.)    
D.Dominant Soil Type     0   
     (.)   
Dominant Soil Type      0.269**** 1.361 
      -6.91 -1.35 
Iowa LL Lake Depth -0.0160*** -0.0181*** 0.0665 0.00915   0.0864 
 (-2.61) (-2.63) -0.95 -0.09   -0.88 
D.Iowa LL Lake Depth     0.0950* 0.065  
     -1.66 -1.23  
Constant 4.417**** 3.802**** 6.954**** 6.540**   0 
 -6.95 -4.8 -4.29 -2.43   (.) 
Observations 570 467 570 467 458 458 358 
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Chlorophyll a 
 RE RE + Lag FE FE + Lag FD FD + lag AB 
 
ln 
chlorophyll 
a 
ln 
chlorophyll 
a 
ln 
chlorophylla 
ln 
chlorophyll 
a 
D.ln 
chlorophyll 
a 
ln 
chlorophyll 
a 
ln 
chlorophyll 
a 
WATERSHARE -0.388 -0.528 4.093 2.44   4.015 
 (-0.56) (-0.88) -1.12 -0.57   -0.89 
DEVELOPEDSHARE -1.782 -1.122 7.219*** -3.77   -0.185 
 (-1.09) (-0.81) -3.07 (-0.88)   (-0.03) 
WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE 1.11 4.274*** 2.885 1.099   5.604 
 -0.71 -2.75 -1.31 -0.43   -1.57 
FORESTTREESSHARE -1.619** -0.905 3.091 -0.356   4.022 
 (-2.57) (-1.48) -1.38 (-0.13)   -1.41 
CORNSHARE -0.0321 0.47 -0.304 -0.265   0.07 
 (-0.06) -0.76 (-0.54) (-0.53)   -0.12 
GRASSPASTURESHARE -0.388 0.496 1.508 0.67   1.538 
 (-0.68) -0.78 -1.2 -0.44   -0.91 
OTHERCROPSSHARE 0.499 0.59 3.281* 2.053   3.041 
 -0.67 -1.07 -1.74 -1   -1.35 
L.lnchlorophylla  0.306****  -0.162****  0.865**** -0.139 
  -5.19  (-3.65)  -35.76 (-1.30) 
D.WATERSHARE     3.236 6.361*  
     -0.82 -1.7  
D.DEVELOPEDSHARE     6.322* 6.654*  
     -1.86 -1.77  
D.WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE     5.243* 4.658  
     -1.79 -1.6  
D.FORESTTREESSHARE     3.558 5.612**  
     -1.29 -2.01  
D.CORNSHARE     0.155 0.129  
     -0.27 -0.24  
D.GRASSPASTURESHARE     1.605 1.28  
     -1.13 -0.94  
D.OTHERCROPSSHARE     3.145 2.344  
     -1.58 -1.23  
PerCRPofCrops 0.541 0.025 -1.209 -0.969   1.387 
 -0.63 -0.04 (-0.86) (-0.43)   -0.46 
D.PerCRPofCrops     0.357 0.989  
     -0.18 -0.51  
PerCornCRP -0.000527*** -0.000366** -0.000435** -0.000329   0.000183 
 (-3.10) (-2.17) (-2.06) (-1.00)   -0.52 
PerGrassPastureCRP -0.00000489 0.0000175 0.000129 0.00000295   0.000420** 
 (-0.08) -0.33 -1.21 -0.02   -2.32 
PerForestTreesCRP 0.000549 -0.0000876 0.00105 0.00192   0.00104 
 -0.9 (-0.15) -0.95 -1.29   -0.53 
PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP -0.000295 -0.000530*** -0.000164 -0.000298   -0.000107 
 (-1.55) (-3.00) (-0.69) (-0.94)   (-0.36) 
PerWaterCRP -0.000419 0.000806 -0.00124 -0.00158   -0.00123 
 (-0.40) -0.65 (-1.21) (-1.42)   (-1.22) 
PerDevelopedCRP 0.00105 0.00077 -0.000421 0.00148   -0.00244 
 -0.84 -0.83 (-0.17) -0.37   (-0.64) 
PerOtherCropsCRP -0.0000886 0.000147 -0.000107 -0.000389   -0.0000777 
 (-0.51) -0.82 (-0.39) (-1.17)   (-0.21) 
D.PerCornCRP     -0.000163 -0.000142  
     (-0.72) (-0.63)  
D.PerGrassPastureCRP     0.000361*** 0.000326**  
     -2.68 -2.25  
D.PerForestTreesCRP     -0.000882 0.000111  
     (-0.64) -0.08  
D.PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP     -0.000207 -0.00022  
     (-0.92) (-0.96)  
D.PerWaterCRP     -0.000435 -0.000911  
     (-0.45) (-0.82)  
D.PerDevelopedCRP     -0.00289 -0.00225  
     (-1.20) (-0.98)  
D.PerOtherCropsCRP     0.000292 0.00023  
     -0.84 -0.71  
Fall_Precip 0.00146 0.000761 -0.00458 0.00537   -0.00306 
 -0.15 -0.06 (-0.45) -0.43   (-0.21) 
Winter_Precip 0.0648**** 0.0485*** 0.0583**** 0.0520***   0.0376** 
 -4.37 -2.77 -3.63 -3.12   -2.24 
Spring_Precip -0.0190*** -0.0229*** -0.0207*** -0.0174**   -0.0283**** 
 (-2.61) (-2.64) (-2.87) (-2.31)   (-3.46) 
Summer_Precip -0.0106*** -0.00197 -0.00654 -0.00846*   -0.0124** 
 (-2.61) (-0.40) (-1.57) (-1.77)   (-2.32) 
D.Fall_Precip     -0.0116 -0.00632  
     (-0.95) (-0.52)  
D.Winter_Precip     0.0432** 0.0437***  
     -2.5 -2.68  
D.Spring_Precip     -0.0316**** -0.0282**** 
     (-4.41) (-4.08)  
D.Summer_Precip     -0.00634 -0.00555  
     (-1.51) (-1.34)  
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CAFO 0.128 0.104 0.0433 0.00565   0.155 
 -1.18 -1.22 -0.3 -0.03   -0.78 
D.CAFO     0.172 0.0395  
     -0.85 -0.23  
Alfisols 0 0 0 0    
 (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Entisols -0.682*** -0.670**** 0 0    
 (-2.88) (-3.37) (.) (.)    
Inceptisols -0.635** -0.580*** 0 0    
 (-2.21) (-2.85) (.) (.)    
Mollisols -0.192 -0.145 0 0    
 (-1.34) (-1.18) (.) (.)    
NoData 0.236 0.207 0 0    
 -1.41 -1.31 (.) (.)    
D.Dominant Soil Type     0   
     (.)   
Dominant Soil Type      0.125**** 0.736 
      -5.36 -1.54 
Iowa LL Lake Depth -0.0544**** -0.0372**** -0.0476 -0.0436   -0.0183 
 (-6.41) (-4.22) (-1.32) (-1.14)   (-0.24) 
D.Iowa LL Lake Depth     -0.0104 -0.00927  
     (-0.24) (-0.21)  
Constant 4.394**** 2.813**** 1.933* 4.125***   0 
 -9.69 -5.68 -1.88 -3.23   (.) 
Observations 570 467 570 467 458 458 358 
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Turbidity  
RE RE + Lag FE FE + Lag FD FD + lag AB  
lnsecchidept
h 
lnsecchidept
h 
lnsecchidept
h 
lnsecchidept
h 
D.lnsecchidep
th 
lnsecchi 
depth 
lnsecchi 
depth 
WATERSHARE -0.335 -0.0194 -1.39 0.852 
  
-1.934  
(-0.45) (-0.05) (-0.31) -0.31 
  
(-0.56) 
DEVELOPEDSHARE 1.287 -0.264 -0.766 1.046 
  
1.003  
-0.82 (-0.28) (-0.29) -0.23 
  
-0.19 
WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE -1.312 -1.534 -0.31 -1.834 
  
-3.390*  
(-0.74) (-1.24) (-0.14) (-0.88) 
  
(-1.67) 
FORESTTREESSHARE 0.758* 0.275 3.329 0.35 
  
-4.057*  
-1.93 -1 -1.53 -0.11 
  
(-1.75) 
CORNSHARE 0.172 -0.0287 0.0275 -0.0884 
  
-0.363  
-0.48 (-0.07) -0.07 (-0.21) 
  
(-0.69) 
GRASSPASTURESHARE -0.322 -0.0664 -0.983 -1.091 
  
-2.672**  
(-0.62) (-0.17) (-0.94) (-0.80) 
  
(-2.37) 
OTHERCROPSSHARE -0.383 -0.469 -1.455 -2.544 
  
-4.988***  
(-0.72) (-1.38) (-0.93) (-1.46) 
  
(-3.10) 
L.lnsecchidepth   0.578**** 
 
0.0521 
 
0.717**** 0.116  
  -11.9 
 
-0.77 
 
-20.57 -1.24 
D.WATERSHARE   
   
-0.177 -1.723 
 
 
  
   
(-0.06) (-0.68) 
 
D.DEVELOPEDSHARE   
   
0.267 0.696 
 
 
  
   
-0.11 -0.29 
 
D.WETLANDSSHRUBLANDSSHARE   
   
-2.565 -1.88 
 
 
  
   
(-1.63) (-1.33) 
 
D.FORESTTREESSHARE   
   
-1.122 -1.242 
 
 
  
   
(-0.54) (-0.63) 
 
D.CORNSHARE   
   
-0.192 -0.138 
 
 
  
   
(-0.49) (-0.39) 
 
D.GRASSPASTURESHARE   
   
-2.172*** -1.633** 
 
 
  
   
(-2.75) (-2.10) 
 
D.OTHERCROPSSHARE   
   
-3.339*** -2.590** 
 
 
  
   
(-2.86) (-2.34) 
 
PerCRPofCrops 0.722 -0.448 1.846 -0.81 
  
-1.146  
-0.91 (-1.02) -1.27 (-0.67) 
  
(-0.66) 
D.PerCRPofCrops   
   
0.722 0.499 
 
 
  
   
-0.85 -0.6 
 
PerCornCRP 0.000260** 0.0000255 0.000335* 0.000133 
  
-0.000135  
-2.16 -0.27 -1.89 -0.53 
  
(-0.57) 
PerGrassPastureCRP 0.000043 -0.0000411 0.000172** 0.00005 
  
-0.000009  
-0.85 (-1.15) -2.43 -0.45 
  
(-0.06) 
PerForestTreesCRP -0.000104 -0.0000862 0.00105 -0.0000392 
  
-0.000714  
(-0.25) (-0.28) -1.46 (-0.04) 
  
(-0.66) 
PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP 0.000330** 0.000339*** 0.000284* 0.000454** 
  
0.000347*  
-2.14 -2.82 -1.79 -2.29 
  
-1.81 
PerWaterCRP 0.00167** 0.0000314 0.00164* 0.00185 
  
0.00160**  
-2.48 -0.05 -1.8 -1.64 
  
-2.04 
PerDevelopedCRP -0.00138 -0.000105 -0.00138 -0.0025 
  
-0.00222  
(-1.58) (-0.20) (-1.35) (-1.31) 
  
(-1.04) 
PerOtherCropsCRP 0.0000542 -0.000159 0.000307 0.000142 
  
0.000352  
-0.39 (-1.30) -1.65 -0.68 
  
-1.54 
D.PerCornCRP   
   
0.00016 0.0000987 
 
 
  
   
-0.98 -0.82 
 
D.PerGrassPastureCRP   
   
0.000111 0.0000587 
 
 
  
   
-1.12 -0.54 
 
D.PerForestTreesCRP   
   
0.000638 0.000272 
 
 
  
   
-0.77 -0.35 
 
D.PerWetlandsShrublandsCRP   
   
0.000374** 0.000288* 
 
 
  
   
-2.49 -1.96 
 
D.PerWaterCRP   
   
0.00111 0.00105 
 
 
  
   
-1.59 -1.55 
 
D.PerDevelopedCRP   
   
-0.0018 -0.0017 
 
 
  
   
(-1.29) (-1.20) 
 
D.PerOtherCropsCRP   
   
0.000309* 0.000173 
 
 
  
   
-1.87 -1.11 
 
Fall_Precip 0.00854 0.0025 0.00688 0.0125 
  
0.00484  
-1.1 -0.29 -0.81 -1.33 
  
-0.41 
Winter_Precip -0.0133 -0.0356*** -0.0208* -0.0275** 
  
-0.0323***  
(-1.24) (-2.76) (-1.85) (-2.45) 
  
(-2.91) 
Spring_Precip -0.0043 0.0103 0.000754 0.0075 
  
0.0129**  
(-0.65) -1.63 -0.11 -1.18 
  
-2.1 
Summer_Precip -0.0000837 0.00880** 0.00316 0.0113*** 
  
0.0108***  
(-0.03) -2.14 -0.94 -2.84 
  
-2.7 
D.Fall_Precip   
   
-0.00881 -0.00878 
 
 
  
   
(-1.05) (-1.05) 
 
D.Winter_Precip   
   
-0.0295*** -0.0248** 
 
 
  
   
(-2.73) (-2.41) 
 
D.Spring_Precip   
   
0.00589 0.00358 
 
 
  
   
-1.2 -0.77 
 
D.Summer_Precip   
   
0.00446 0.00525* 
 
 
  
   
-1.55 -1.89 
 
CAFO -0.098 -0.000419 0.00103 -0.0977 
  
-0.0557 
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(-1.03) (-0.01) -0.01 (-0.57) 
  
(-0.25) 
D.CAFO   
   
-0.0779 0.0622 
 
 
  
   
(-0.33) -0.19 
 
Alfisols 0 0 0 0 
   
 
(.) (.) (.) (.) 
   
Entisols 0.239 -0.0759 0 0 
   
 
-1.34 (-0.59) (.) (.) 
   
Inceptisols 0.733**** 0.188* 0 0 
   
 
-3.56 -1.92 (.) (.) 
   
Mollisols 0.176 0.0389 0 0 
   
 
-1.41 -0.55 (.) (.) 
   
NoData -0.228 -0.109 0 0 
   
 
(-1.23) (-1.13) (.) (.) 
   
oD.Dominant Soil Type   
   
0 
  
 
  
   
(.) 
  
Dominant Soil Type   
    
-0.00372 0.403  
  
    
(-0.48) -1.26 
Iowa LL Lake Depth 0.0621**** 0.0331**** 0.0406 0.0223 
  
0.00418  
-8.87 -6.8 -1.35 -0.78 
  
-0.13 
D.Iowa LL Lake Depth   
   
0.00696 0.00748 
 
 
  
   
-0.4 -0.33 
 
Constant -0.732** -0.291 -0.541 -0.303 
  
0  
(-2.21) (-0.99) (-0.63) (-0.24) 
  
(.) 
Observations 570 467 570 467 458 458 358 
 
  
 129 
 
APPENDIX B 
CONSERVATION PRACTICE AVERAGE PAYMENTS ($)  
AND AVERAGE SIZE (ACRE) 
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Practice # Conservation Practice 
Enrollment 
Type 
Price per 
Acre per 
Year ($) 
Average 
Contract 
Size (Acre) 
Contract 
Size Price 
($) 
1 
Establishment of 
Permanent 
Introduced 
Grasses and 
Legumes 
General sign-
up 
(continuous 
sign-up in 
approved 
wellhead 
protection 
areas) 
174.79 48.18 8420.95 
2 
Establishment of 
Permanent 
Native Grasses 
General sign-
up 
(continuous 
sign-up in 
approved 
wellhead 
protection 
areas) 
168.79 44.95 7587.48 
3 Tree Planting 
General sign-
up (unless in 
a wellhead 
protection 
area when it 
is eligible for 
continuous 
sign-up) 
161.84 23.04 3728.92 
3A Hardwood Tree Planting 
General sign-
up (unless in 
a wellhead 
protection 
area when it 
is eligible for 
continuous 
sign-up) 
171.16 24.97 4273.3 
4B 
Permanent 
Wildlife Habitat 
(Corridors), 
Noneasement 
General sign-
up (unless in 
a wellhead 
protection 
area when it 
is eligible for 
continuous 
sign-up)  
156.95 25.89 4063.22 
4D 
Permanent 
Wildlife Habitat, 
Noneasement 
General sign-
up (under 
certain 
conditions as 
continuous 
sign-up) 
138.36 42.52 5883.49 
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5A 
Field Windbreak 
Establishment, 
Noneasement 
Continuous 254.49 6.09 1550.27 
8A 
Grass 
Waterways, 
Noneasement 
Continuous 250.39 5.05 1264.08 
9 
Shallow Water 
Areas for 
Wildlife 
Continuous 206.03 7.28 1499.29 
10 
Vegetative 
Cover – Grass – 
Already 
Established 
General sign-
up (unless in 
a wellhead 
protection 
area when it 
is eligible for 
continuous 
sign-up) 
147.61 55.37 8173.36 
11 
Vegetative 
Cover – Trees – 
Already 
Established 
General 135.84 21.19 2878.05 
12 Wildlife Food Plot General 157.51 44.19 6961.17 
15A 
Establishment of 
Permanent 
Vegetative 
Cover (Contour 
Grass Strips), 
Noneasement 
Continuous 197.78 11.72 2318.52 
15B 
Establishment of 
Permanent 
Vegetative 
Cover (Contour 
Grass Strips) on 
Terraces 
Continuous 201.86 9.86 1990.34 
16A 
Shelterbelt 
Establishment, 
Noneasement 
Continuous 222.52 1.94 431.83 
17A 
Living Snow 
Fences, 
Noneasement 
Continuous 200.33 3.45 691.52 
21 Filter Strips Continuous 251.93 9.28 2338.99 
22 Riparian Buffer Continuous 136.87 13.03 1783.83 
23 Wetland Restoration Continuous 231.06 39.29 9078.18 
23A 
Wetland 
Restoration, 
Non-Floodplain 
Continuous 230.04 79.98 18398.77 
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24 
Establishment of 
Permanent 
Vegetative 
Cover as Cross 
Wind Trap 
Strips 
Continuous 176.52 56.96 10054.58 
25 
Rare and 
Declining 
Habitat 
General 169.38 38.35 6494.72 
27 
Farmable 
Wetlands Pilot 
Wetland 
Continuous 249.7 21.16 5282.58 
28 
Farmable 
Wetlands Pilot 
Buffer 
Continuous 247.64 17.47 4326.82 
29 
Marginal 
Pastureland 
Wildlife Habitat 
Buffer 
Continuous 83.47 8.86 739.22 
30 
Marginal 
Pastureland 
Wetland Buffer 
Continuous 80.1 13.37 1071.19 
31 
Bottomland 
Timber 
Establishment 
on Wetlands 
Continuous 251.89 17.95 4521.94 
33 Habitat Buffers for Upland Birds Continuous 192.61 8.36 1609.42 
35E 
Emergency 
Forestry – 
Softwood – New 
Continuous 199 22.17 4411.17 
37 Duck Nesting Habitat Continuous 241.08 35.86 8645.72 
38A SAFE – Buffers Continuous 210.34 12.8 2692.35 
38B SAFE – Wetlands Continuous 177.71 34.63 6153.43 
38C SAFE – Trees Continuous 175.31 13.81 2420.92 
38E SAFE – Grass Continuous 207.74 35.77 7430.24 
39 
Farmable 
Wetland 
Program 
Constructed 
Wetland 
Continuous 221.55 16.8 3723.09 
41 
Farmable 
Wetland 
Program 
Flooded Prairie 
Wetland 
Continuous 199.11 12.17 2422.55 
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42 Pollinator Habitat 
General and 
Continuous 201.91 24.81 5009.9 
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APPENDIX C 
DESCRIPTION OF CRP CONSERVATION PRACTICES 
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CP1: Establishment of Permanent Introduced Grasses and Legumes 
- Establish or maintain existing permanent introduced grasses and legumes 
- Enhance environmental benefits 
- General sign-up (continuous sign-up in approved wellhead protection areas) 
 
CP2: Establishment of Permanent Native Grasses 
- Establish or maintain existing vegetative cover of native grasses 
- Enhance environmental benefits 
- General sign-up (continuous sign-up in approved wellhead protection areas) 
 
CP3: Tree Planting 
- Establish new or maintain existing stand of trees in a timber planting 
- Enhance environmental benefits 
- Multipurpose forest benefits 
- General sign-up (unless in a wellhead protection area when it is eligible for 
continuous sign-up) 
 
CP3A: Hardwood Tree Planting 
- Establish and maintain a new stand or an existing stand of predominantly 
hardwood trees in a timber planting 
- Enhance environmental benefits 
- Multipurpose forest benefits 
- General sign-up (unless in a wellhead protection area when it is eligible for 
continuous sign-up) 
 
CP4B: Permanent Wildlife Habitat (Corridors), Noneasement 
- Establish a permanent wildlife corridor between two existing wildlife habitat 
areas 
- Enhance the wildlife 
- 66 to 200 feet in width 
- General sign-up (unless in a wellhead protection area when it is eligible for 
continuous sign-up) 
 
CP4D: Permanent Wildlife Habitat, Noneasement 
- Establish new or maintain existing permanent wildlife habitat cover 
- Enhance the wildlife 
- General sign-up (under certain conditions as continuous sign-up) 
 
CP5A: Field Windbreak Establishment, Noneasement 
- Establish windbreaks 
- Reduce cropland erosion (wind erosion) 
- Enhance wildlife habitat 
- Continuous sign-up 
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CP8A: Grass Waterways, Noneasement 
- Establish grass waterways 
- Convey runoff from terraces, diversions, or other water concentrations without 
causing erosion or flooding 
- Improve water quality 
- Should not exceed width of 100 feet 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP9: Shallow Water Areas for Wildlife 
- Develop or restore shallow water areas for wildlife 
- The practice must include an adequate buffer of perennial vegetation to protect 
the water quality and provide wildlife habitat 
- Should not exceed 10 acres per tract 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP10: Vegetative Cover – Grass – Already Established 
- CP10 eligible to be offered before March 14, 2011 
- Grass cover is already established 
- Pollinator habitat and wildlife water development 
- Enhance environmental benefits 
- General sign-up (unless in a wellhead protection area when it is eligible for 
continuous sign-up) 
 
CP11: Vegetative Cover – Trees – Already Established 
- CP11 eligible to be offered before March 11, 2011 
- Trees are already established 
- Enhance environmental benefits 
- General sign-up 
 
CP12: Wildlife Food Plot 
- Establish annual or perennial wildlife food plots 
- Enhance wildlife and wildlife habitat 
- Prevent degradation of environmental benefits 
- Should not exceed five acres in size 
- General sign-up 
 
CP15A: Establishment of Permanent Vegetative Cover (Contour Grass Strips), 
Noneasement 
- Establish strips of permanent vegetative cover generally following the contour on 
eligible cropland alternated with wider cultivated strips 
- Reduce erosion and control runoff 
- Minimum width is 15 feet, maximum of 30 feet 
- Continuous sign-up 
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CP15B: Establishment of Permanent Vegetative Cover (Contour Grass Strips) on 
Terraces 
- Establish vegetative cover on terraces 
- Enhance water quality and reduce soil erosion 
- Not to develop or establish wildlife habitat 
- Maximum cannot exceed 60 feet including the buffer 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP16A: Shelterbelt Establishment, Noneasement 
- Establish shelterbelts on a farm or ranch 
- Enhance wildlife habitat, save energy, protect farmsteads or livestock areas 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP17A: Living Snow Fences, Noneasement 
- Establish living snow fences 
- Manage snow, reduce wind erosion, provide living screen, enhance wildlife 
habitat 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP21: Filter Strips 
- Remove nutrients, sediment, organic matter, pesticides, and other pollutants from 
surface runoff and subsurface flow by deposition, absorption, plant uptake, 
denitrification, and other processes, and thereby reduce pollution and protect 
surface water and subsurface water quality while enhancing the ecosystem of the 
water body 
- Must be immediately adjacent or parallel to a seasonal stream, a stream having 
perennial flow, wetlands, a permanent water body like a lake or pond 
- The minimum acceptable width is 20 feet 
- The maximum average width is 120 feet 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP22: Riparian Buffer 
- Remove nutrients, sediment, organic matter, pesticides, and other pollutants from 
surface runoff and subsurface flow by deposition, absorption, plant uptake, 
denitrification, and other processes, and thereby reduce pollution and protect 
surface water and subsurface water quality while enhancing the ecosystem of the 
water body 
- Improve habitat for aquatic organisms 
- Habitat for wildlife 
- Must be immediately adjacent or parallel to a seasonal stream, a stream having 
perennial flow, wetlands, a permanent water body like a lake or pond 
- Minimum size is 35 feet in width and maximum size is 180 feet 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP23 Wetland Restoration 
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- Restore the functions and values of wetland ecosystems that have been devoted to 
agricultural use 
- Increase sediment trapping efficiencies, improve surface and ground water 
quality, prevent excess erosion, provide habitat, reduce flood flows 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP23A: Wetland Restoration, Non-Floodplain 
- Restore the functions and values of wetland ecosystems that have been devoted to 
agricultural use 
- Located outside the 100-year floodplain 
- Increase sediment trapping efficiencies, improve surface and ground water 
quality, prevent excess erosion, provide habitat, reduce flood flows 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP24: Establishment of Permanent Vegetative Cover as Cross Wind Trap Strips 
- Establish one or more strips of permanent vegetative cover resistant to wind 
erosion 
- Reduce on-farm wind erosion, trap wind-borne sediments, protect public health 
and safety 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP25: Rare and Declining Habitat 
- Restore the functions and values of critically endangered and threatened habitats 
- Includes trees, grasses, prairies, etc. 
- Wetlands in Iowa 
- General sign-up 
 
CP27: Farmable Wetlands Pilot Wetland 
- Restore the functions and values of wetlands that have been devoted to 
agricultural use 
- Hydrology and vegetation must be restored to the maximum extent possible 
- Retire chronically wet cropland 
- Protect soil from erosion, improve water quality, and enhance habitat 
- Maximum size is 40 acres 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP28: Farmable Wetlands Pilot Buffer  
- Provide a vegetative buffer around wetlands (CP27) to remove sediment, 
nutrients, and pollutants from impacting the wetland and to provide wildlife 
habitat for the associated wetland 
- Protect soil from erosion, improve water quality, and enhance habitat 
- 100,000 acres in any one state 
- Minimum size is 30 feet surrounding a wetland 
- Maximum size is 4 times the size of the wetland 
- Must be enrolled with CP27 or CP41 
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- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP29: Marginal Pastureland Wildlife Habitat Buffer 
- Remove nutrients, sediment, organic matter, pesticides, and other pollutants from 
surface runoff and subsurface flow by deposition, absorption, plant uptake, 
denitrification, and other processes, and thereby reduce pollution and protect 
surface water and subsurface water quality while enhancing the ecosystem of the 
water body 
- Stabilize stream banks, reduce flood damage, restore and enhance wildlife habitat 
- Must be immediately adjacent or parallel to a seasonal stream, a stream having 
perennial flow, wetlands, a permanent water body like a lake or pond 
- Minimum width is 20 feet and the maximum width is 120 feet 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP30: Marginal Pastureland Wetland Buffer 
- Remove nutrients, sediment, organic matter, pesticides, and other pollutants from 
surface runoff and subsurface flow by deposition, absorption, plant uptake, 
denitrification, and other processes, and thereby reduce pollution and protect 
surface water and subsurface water quality while enhancing the ecosystem of the 
water body 
- Goal is to enhance water quality, reduce nutrient and pollution levels, and 
improve wildlife habitat 
- Must be immediately adjacent or parallel to a seasonal stream, a stream having 
perennial flow, wetlands, a permanent water body like a lake or pond 
- Minimum width is 20 feet and the maximum width is 120 feet 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP31: Bottomland Timber Establishment on Wetlands 
- Establish and provide long-term viability of a bottomland hardwood stand of trees 
- Control erosion, reduce pollution, restore and enhance wetlands, promote carbon 
sequestration, wildlife habitat 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP33: Habitat Buffers for Upland Birds 
- Provide food and cover for quail and upland birds in cropland areas 
- Secondary benefits are reducing erosion, increase soil and water quality, and 
protecting and enhancing on-farm ecosystems 
- Minimum width is 30 feet and the maximum width is 120 feet 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP35E: Emergency Forestry – Softwood – New 
- Establish a stand of trees in a timber planting 
- Enhance environmental benefits 
- Continuous sign-up 
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CP37: Duck Nesting Habitat 
- Enhance duck nesting habitat on the most duck-productive areas of Iowa, 
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota to restore the functions 
and values of wetland ecosystems that have been devoted to agricultural use 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP38A: SAFE – Buffers 
- State acres for wildlife enhancement 
- A specified habitat can be restored and maintained 
- Continuous CRP sign-up 
 
CP38B: SAFE – Wetlands 
- A specified habitat can be restored and maintained 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP38C: SAFE – Trees 
- A specified habitat can be restored and maintained 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP38D: SAFE – Longleaf Pine 
- A specified habitat can be restored and maintained 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP38E: SAFE – Grass 
- A specified habitat can be restored and maintained 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP39: Farmable Wetland Program Constructed Wetland 
- Develop a constructed wetland to treat effluent from row crop agricultural 
drainage systems 
- Reduce nutrient and sediment loading and improve other water quality benefits 
- Wildlife habitat 
- Minimum of 25% of the upstream watershed is comprised of row crop 
agricultural drained land 
- Maximum size is 40 acres per tract 
- Continuous sign-up 
 
CP41: FWP Flooded Prairie Wetland 
- Restore the functions and values of wetlands that have been subject to the natural 
overflow of a prairie wetland 
- Hydrology and vegetation must be restored 
- Located in Prairie Pothole region (part in Iowa) 
- 20 contiguous acres 
- Continuous sign-up 
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CP42: Pollinator Habitat 
- Establish habitat 
- Support a diversity of pollinator species 
- At least .5 acres 
- General and continuous sign-up 
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APPENDIX D 
RELEVANT CRP SIGN-UP PERIODS 
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Sign-up Periods 
31 Continuous October 1, 2005- September 30, 2006  
32 REX April 2006, June 2006 Expiring Contracts 
33 General March 22, 2006 - April 28, 2006 
35 Continuous October 1, 2006- September 30, 2007 
36 Continuous October 1, 2007- September 30, 2008  
37 Continuous October 1, 2008 - September 30, 2009  
38 Continuous October 1, 2009 - September 30, 2010 
39 General August 2, 2010 - August 27, 2010 
40 Continuous October 1, 2010 – September 30, 2011 
41 General March 14, 2011 – April 15, 2011 
42 Continuous October 1, 2011 – September 30, 2012 
43 General March 12, 2012 – April 13, 2012 
44 Continuous 2013 
45 General May 20, 2013 and ended June 14, 2013. 
46 Continuous 2014 
47 Continuous 2015 
48 Continuous 2016 
49 General December 1, 2015 to February 26, 2016. 
50 Continuous 2017 
51 Continuous 2018 
 
Note: Contracts expire at the end of the fiscal year, September 30th. 
